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This research analyzes the successful and less successful practices of the 
Fort Ord Restoration Advisory Board in. expediting environmental cleanup at Fort 
Ord, making former military land available for civilian use. It includes descriptions 
of Base Realignment and Closure selection criteria, President Clinton's 
Revitalization Initiative, the Restoration Advisory Board process, and an extensive 
literature review of citizen involvement in advisory groups and conflict. 
Nine semi-structured interviews were conducted with Army 
representatives, regulatory agency representatives, citizens, and other individuals 
that were either members of or associated with the Fort Ord Restoration Advisory 
Board. 
This paper draws conclusions and offers recommendations about how 
challenges encountered by the Fort Ord Restoration Advisory Board can be 
avoided at other military installations that either have existing advisory boards or 
are required to form boards due to future Base Realignment and Closure actions. 
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This study analyzes the Restoration Advisory Board (RAB) process and its 
successful and less-successful practices in facilitating "fast-track" cleanup at former 
military installations, and examines the effectiveness of the advisory group structure for 
accomplishing RAB goals using the Fort Ord RAB as a case study. 
B. BACKGROUND 
In 1993, President Clinton announced a five-part plan to revitalize communities 
where military installations had been closed. One of the major objectives of this plan was 
"fast-track" environmental cleanup of installation property. Accelerating the cleanup 
process allows property to be quickly and safely transferred to the community, which 
promotes economic recovery of the area. To accomplish this task, a RAB would be 
established at each closed installation with the purpose of: 
1. Acting as a forum for the discussion and exchange of information between 
agencies and the community. 
2. Providing an opportunity for stakeholders to review progress and participate in a 
dialogue with decision-makers. (Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of 
Defense (Environmental Security), 1998, p. 30) 
The Fort Ord Restoration Advisory Board was established in 1994 and has 
experienced considerable difficulties environmentally restoring the former military 
installation, and obtaining consensus from military representatives and civilians. RAB 
members have experienced frustration and, despite enlisting the efforts of three mediation 
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groups, lawsuits and high personnel turnover have resulted, causing the "fast-track" 
cleanup efforts at Fort Ord to suffer numerous delays. 
C.       RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Primary: 
What are the successful and less-successful practices of the Restoration Advisory 
Board process in transitioning Fort Ord from military to civilian use? 
Secondary: 
1. What is the overall Presidential and Department of Defense process for 
revitalizing base closure communities? 
2. Who are the key stakeholders involved in the Fort Ord restoration process, 
including their roles, missions, and expectations? 
3. What are the elements of commonality and contention among the stakeholders 
involved in the Restoration Advisory Board process? 
4. How effective is the advisory group structure in accomplishing Restoration 
Advisory Board goals? 
5. What actions and behaviors of the key stakeholders appear to have 
successfully and/or less-successfully affected Restoration Advisory Board mission 
accomplishment? 
6. How do the stakeholders of the Fort Ord Restoration Advisory Board deal with 
conflict? 
7. What interventions by conflict resolution groups appear to increase and/or 
decrease collaborative behavior among Fort Ord Restoration Advisory Board 
stakeholders? 
D.        SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY 
This thesis is concerned with the successful and less-successful practices of the 
Restoration Advisory Board process, specifically the Fort Ord Restoration Advisory 
Board, and the effectiveness of the advisory group structure in accomplishing RAB 
mission objectives. It will begin with an overview of the Base Realignment and Closure 
process and the Presidential and Department of Defense initiative establishing 
Restoration Advisory Boards. Second, an analysis of citizen involvement in advisory 
groups with additional emphasis on autonomy, expectations versus reality, and conflict 
will be conducted. Finally, conclusions will be drawn and recommendations made based 
on information gathered. 
The methodology for this research will include an extensive literature review of 
citizen involvement in advisory groups and conflict resolution. Data collection for 
answering the research questions will be based on archival review of four years of Fort 
Ord Restoration Advisory Board minutes, attendance of four Fort Ord RAB meetings, 
and nine semi-structured interviews of RAB members and individuals associated with the 
RAB. 
Results from these interviews will be analyzed and conclusions drawn about 
successful and less-successful aspects of this case study. Lessons learned will be 
provided to assist military installation commanders and civic leaders to more effectively 
collaborate on future projects. 
E. EXPECTED BENEFITS 
As stated in the Presidential and DoD initiative, Restoration Advisory Boards are 
required at all closing bases. Additionally, operating bases are encouraged to establish 
Restoration Advisory Boards to provide a forum in which the local community can 
become more involved with environmental issues concerning a military installation. By 
determining processes and interventions that created positive outcomes and those that did 
not, future Restoration Advisory Boards and government policy makers will have a better 
understanding of how to accomplish this challenging process. 
F. ORGANIZATION OF THESIS 
This thesis is organized into five chapters. Following this first chapter is a 
presentation of background information that explains base realignment and closure 
processes. Topics include criteria used to select military bases for realignment or closure, 
the presidential revitalization initiative to restore economic prosperity in communities 
with closed military bases, and individuals and groups relevant to base closure and 
transition. Additional information is provided regarding the Fast-Track Cleanup section 
of the presidential revitalization initiative, Restoration Advisory Boards, and difficulties 
implementing the Fast-Track Cleanup program and operating Restoration Advisory 
Boards. Finally, an in depth review of the Fort Ord Restoration Advisory Board is 
provided. 
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To better understand challenges encountered by citizen advisory groups, such as 
the Fort Ord Restoration Advisory Board, a literature review was conducted. Areas of 
discussion in the literature review are citizen involvement in bureaucratic processes, 
autonomy and its relation to advisory groups, expectations versus reality of group 
members, and conflict among individuals and groups involved in the process. 
Following the literature review, semi-structured interviews and an extensive 
archival review of Fort Ord Restoration Advisory Board meeting minutes were conducted 
to determine if the Fort Ord Restoration Advisory Board overcame challenges facing 
citizen advisory groups or succumbed to them. The results of the questionnaire used to 
conduct the semi-structured interviews and the archival review are presented in this 
chapter. 
The final chapter discusses the results of the previous chapter and how they 
correlate to findings of the literature review. Conclusions are drawn regarding how the 
Fort Ord Restoration Advisory Board performed and recommendations are made to assist 
existing and future Restoration Advisory Boards. Finally, the primary research question 
is answered and areas of suggested follow-on research are provided. 
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IL BACKGROUND 
This chapter briefly explains the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) history 
and selection criteria, including the President's Revitalization Initiative and Five-Point 
Plan to speed economic redevelopment of base closure communities. Additionally, the 
chapter reviews the Fast-Track Cleanup Program, the Restoration Advisory Board 
process, and other initiatives relevant to environmental cleanup. 
A.       BASE REALIGNMENT AND CLOSURE SELECTION CRITERIA 
By the end of the Cold War, the Department of Defense (DoD) was already taking 
actions to reduce its infrastructure. To accomplish this, the Base Realignment and 
Closure (BRAC) Commission was formed to identify installations that could be closed or 
realigned. The categories used to determine installations for closure or realignment have 
remained the same through all four BRAC rounds. The basic categories are military 
value, return on investment, and community impact (U.S. Congress, House, 1995). Each 
category contains additional selection criteria. 
Four criteria are used to determine the military value of an installation. Initially 
considered are current and future DoD mission requirements and the potential effect on 
operational readiness. Secondly, the availability and condition of land, facilities and 
associated aifspaee-at botfr the existing installation and potential receiving installations is 
assessed. Next is the capability of an existing installation and potential receiving 
installations to accommodate contingency, mobilization, and future total force 
requirements. Finally, cost and manpower implications are considered. (U.S. Congress, 
House, 1995) 
The criterion for return on investment is the extent and timing of potential costs 
and savings. This includes the number of years, beginning with the date of completion of 
the closure or realignment, for the savings to exceed the costs. (U.S. Congress, House, 
1995) 
Community impact includes estimates of the economic effect on the community 
that has the closing base, as well as the ability of the existing or potential receiving 
communities' infrastructure to support forces, missions, and personnel, and the 
environmental impact (U.S. Congress, House, 1995). 
In a hearing before the House Military Installations and Facilities Subcommittee, 
Mr. Gotbaum, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Economic Security, stated, "[I]n 
making the base closing decision we [OSD] do not consider environmental cleanup costs 
on the basis that it is our responsibility to comply with the law and to do environmental 
cleanup whether a base is open or closed." (U.S. Congress, House, 1995, p. 5) While 
environmental cleanup costs are not a criteria for determining base closure or return on 
investment, they have contributed significantly to the delays in transferring property to 
civilian use. Environmental cleanup concerns also provided impetus for the Presidential 
Revitalization Initiative. The next section reviews relevant aspects of the Presidential 
Revitalization Initiative, followed by the Five-Point Plan and the use of Restoration 
Advisory Boards as part of the Fast-Track Cleanup Program. 
B.        PRESIDENTIAL REVTTALIZATION INITIATIVE 
According to a Congressional Budget Office assessment (CBO, 1996), the current 
DoD estimate is that it will cost $6.6 billion to environmentally clean the bases scheduled 
for closing from the first four BRAC rounds. Additionally, the CBO claims that this 
amount is underestimated because it only accounts for the money required during the six- 
year period governing the completion of the BRAC process. In many cases, cleaning up 
buried ordnance and contaminated groundwater will probably take much longer than six 
years and will incur substantial additional operating and support costs. Specifically, 
estimates for cleaning up 1991 BRAC installations, which includes Fort Ord, CA, 
increased from about $800 million to $2 billion. Estimates are likely to continue to 
increase because most of DoD's cleanup work is still in the early phase of investigation 
and analysis. 
Because of the rising costs of environmental cleanup and the slow pace of land 
transfer, President Clinton announced a Five-Point Plan to speed the economic recovery 
of base closure communities. As stated in the Base Reuse Implementation Manual (1997, 
p. 1-4), the five points of the presidential program are: 
1. Job-centered property disposal that puts local economic redevelopment 
first. 
2. Fast-Track environmental cleanup that removes needless delays while 
protecting human health and the environment. 
3. Assignment of on-site Base Transition Coordinators at major bases slated 
for closure to assist communities and the Military Departments with 
property disposal and economic redevelopment. 
4. Easy access to transition and redevelopment help for workers and 
communities. 
5. Quick economic development planning grants to base closure 
communities. 
The goals of the new initiative are rapid redevelopment and creation of new jobs 
in base closure communities. Over five years, program resources will total about $5.0 
billion. Of this amount, $2.8 billion will be spent on economic development and 
transition assistance for base closure communities and civilian employees at the bases. 
The remaining $2.2 billion will be spent on environmental cleanup. (Office of the Deputy 
Under Secretary of Defense (Industrial Affairs and Installations), 1997) 
C.       INDIVIDUALS AND GROUPS RELEVANT TO BASE CLOSURE AND 
TRANSITION 
To implement the Five-Point Plan, individuals and groups must be designated and 
appointed to represent DoD and community interests in the environmental cleanup 
process. For example, each closing installation has a Base Transition Coordinator (BTC) 
to facilitate the transition of an installation to civilian use. The BTC acts as the local 
DoD liaison facilitating closure and reuse actions, such as inventory of property, 
environmental cleanup, and resolution of reuse issues. The BRAC Environmental 
Coordinator (BEC) is the DoD's single point of contact for environmental cleanup issues 
at closing bases and is a member of the BRAC Cleanup Team. The BRAC Cleanup 
Team (BCT) has three environmental cleanup managers, including the BEC and 
regulators representing the appropriate state environmental agency and the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). (DoD, 1995) 
The Restoration Advisory Board (RAB) is a group of citizens representing local 
businesses, minority groups, environmental groups, and communities who volunteer to 
serve as the community's voice on cleanup plans and decisions. The RAB is co-chaired 
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by representatives of DoD and the community. The RAB, which generally has a diverse 
membership that is representative of the community at large, provides advice and 
comment from the community to the BCT. (DoD, 1995) 
Also included in the base transition process, but not part of the Five-Point Plan is 
the Local Redevelopment Authority (LRA). The LRA is any authority or instrumentality 
established by a state or local government and recognized by the Secretary of Defense 
through the Office of Economic Adjustment as the entity responsible for preparing the 
redevelopment plan for the installation or for directing implementation of the plan (DoD, 
1995). 
D.        FAST-TRACK CLEANUP PROGRAM 
As part of the Five-Point Plan, the Fast-Track Cleanup Program is governed by 
three guiding principles: protect human health and the environment; make property 
available for reuse and transfer; and provide effective community involvement (Office of 
the Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Environmental Cleanup), 1996). To 
achieve these guiding principles, the Fast-Track Cleanup Program policy, first issued in 
September 1993, provides three guidance and two policy memoranda. Appendix F of the 
Base Reuse Implementation Manual (1997), issued by the Office of the Deputy Under 
Secretary of Defense (Industrial Affairs and Installations), furnishes these memoranda. 
Guidance memoranda detailing procedures on how to implement the Fast-Track 
Cleanup Program include: establishing BRAC Cleanup Teams and conducting 
comprehensive "bottom up" reviews of cleanup plans at closing installations; accelerating 
the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) process; and involving the public by 
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making information available, providing opportunities to comment, and seeking public 
participation on a RAB. 
Policy memoranda provide general guidance to DoD Components on the 
processes of determining environmental suitability to lease, and identifying 
uncontaminated parcels of land applying the Community Environmental Response 
Facilitation Act (CERFA). The policy memoranda do not specify implementation 
procedures thus allowing the BRAC installation to develop procedures suitable to their 
organizational needs without violating minimum requirements. 
By November 1993, five months after the announcement of the Five-Point Plan, 
all 77 major closing or realigning installations established BCTs. After nine months, 
BCTs completed comprehensive, "bottom-up^ reviews of environmental cleanup plans. 
(Office of the Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Environmental Cleanup), 
1996) 
In support of the Fast-Track Cleanup Program, EPA and DoD established a 
Memorandum of Understanding under which DoD provides funding to EPA for support 
beyond theroles and responsibtKties mandatedby statuter Examples of additional 
support from EPA include: senior-level Remedial Program Managers serving on 70 
BCTs, and-teehmeal expertiseand^suppoftfromhydrologists, toxicologists, community 
relations specialists, and attorneys. By making technical experts readily available to 
BCTs, DoD's envirormientatdeanurrclecision-maMn^proeesses are expedited, which 
allows cleanup actions to begin sooner. (Defense Environmental Response Task Force, 
1995) 
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To provide a better understanding of these guidelines, short explanations of each 
ensue. TheNational Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) requires public involvement 
throughout the planning process to build consensus for the final environmental cleanup 
plan. Additionally, four compliance documents are required to satisfy NEPA. These 
documents are an Environmental Assessment (EA), a Finding of No Significant Impacts 
(FONSE>, an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS), and a Record of Decision (ROD). 
The EA determines if there are any significant impacts at the site. From the EA, either no 
significant impacts are found and theFONSI is generated, or significant impacts are 
found and the EIS is generated. The ROD is the plan approved to cleanup the sites 
identified in an EIS. (NEPA, 1969) 
DoD says that the Fast-Track Cleanup Program increases the speed of the NEPA 
process by requiring installations to complete the EIS within one year after a LRA 
submits the reuse plan (Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Industrial 
Affairs and Installations), 1997). The problem is that reuse plans have taken long periods 
of time to complete and have changed during the restoration process requiring changes to 
the EIS. RABs and BCTs utilize reuse plans as a basis for discussion of appropriate 
remedies for cleaning up property and preparing it for transfer. 
Lease of property prior to environmental cleanup is another method DoD expects 
will speed redevelopment of base closure communities. However, DoD's authorization 
and appropriations acts for 1993 contained different provisions regarding the 
government's liability for theiransfer of contaminated property. DoD viewed the 
appropriations act as exposing the government to costly claims because of sweeping DoD 
indemnification language inthe law. In contrast, the authorization act limited DoD 
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environmental cleanup liability to conditions prior to transfer. In response, DoD stopped 
entering into any leases or transferring property, which delayed the transfer of property 
for fear of future claims. Congress subsequently repealed the appropriations language 
and let the authorization language stand, which limited DoD's liability to environmental 
contamination prior to property transfer. With this clarification, DoD proceeded with 
efforts to lease and transfer property prior to cleanup. (GAO/NSIAD-95-70,1995) 
The Community Environmental Response Facilitation Act (CERFA, 1992), 
amends the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act 
(CERCL A), and requires Federal agencies to identify property on which neither 
hazardous substances nor petroleum products or derivatives were stored for one year or 
more, released, or disposed. After DoD identifies uncontaminated parcels, Federal and 
state environmental agencies must concur with DoD findings before the land can be 
transferred   As of September 1995, DoD identified about 164,000 uncontaminated acres, 
but only about 76,000 of those acres met Fegulatory agency approval for immediate 
transfer (CBO, 1996). 
The Fast-Track Cleanup Program directs DoD to involve the community near a 
closing base in the cleanup program by making information available, providing 
opportunities for comment, and establishing and seeking public participation on a 
Restoration Advisory Board (RAB). The RAB works in partnership with the BRAC 
Cleanup Team (BCT) on cleanup issues and related matters. Through the RAB, 
stakeholders may review progress and provide input to the decision making process. 
Stakeholders, as defined by DoD and EPA, are parties that are actually or potentially 
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affected by restoration activities at a closing or realigning installation. (Office of the 
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Industrial Affairs and Installations), 1997) 
E.        RESTORATION ADVISORY BOARD 
This section further clarifies aspects of a Restoration Advisory Board including 
purpose, additional establishment criteria, procedures implementing RAB guidelines, and 
the fundamental responsibilities of the RAB and its members. The purpose of a RAB is 
to act as a forum for the discussion and exchange of information between agencies and 
the community, and to provide an opportunity for stakeholders to review progress and 
participate in a dialogue with decision-makers (DoD, 1998). The purpose of the RAB is 
not necessarily to obtain consensus among its members, but to provide advice to 
decision-makers (i.e., BCT, EPA, and state regulatory agencies) on restoration issues. By 
allowing stakeholders to have a voice in the restoration process, RABs can improve 
DoD's cleanup program by increasing community understanding and support for cleanup 
efforts, improve the soundness of government decisions, and ensure cleanups are 
responsive to community needs (Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense 
(Industrial Affairs and Installations), 1997). 
According to DoD policy, one of four criteria must exist to establish a RAB: an 
installation closes and property is to be transferred to the community; or, at least 50 
citizens petition for an advisory board at an operating installation; or, federal, state, or 
local government requests the formation of an advisory board; or, the installation 
determines the need for an advisory board. (Defense Environmental Restoration 
Program, 1996) 
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The RAB serves as an outgrowth of the Technical Review Committee (TRC) 
concept to provide a more comprehensive forum to discuss environmental restoration 
issues. Mandated by Title 10 USC Section 2705 (c), TRCs consist of representatives 
from the installation, EPA, state regulators, local authorities, and a single public 
representative. Title 10 USC Section 2705 (c) also mandated that where TRCs or other 
similar groups already exist, they shall be expanded or modified to become RABs, rather 
than creating a separate committee. 
In order to convert a TRC to a RAB, theManagement Guidance for the Defense 
Environmental Restoration Program (1998) outlines four steps that must be taken. First, 
additional representatives from the community are selected. These individuals should 
include the Local Redevelopment Authority and citizen representatives to include 
environmental and public interest groups, local government, and individual community 
members. The membership selection process is conducted in a fair and open manner, 
ideally by a community selection panel. The installation should accept the panel's 
nominations unless it determines that the nominees do not reflect the full range of views 
within the community. Second, a Community Co-Chair is selected, preferably by the 
community representatives, to serve with the DoD Installation Co-Chair, usually the 
BEC. Third, meetings are opened to the public. Finally, information and views are 
obtained from the public and provided to decision-makers. 
Once a RAB is established, the Management Guidance for the Defense 
Environmental Restoration Program (1998) provides additional steps taken before the 
RAB can begin to function. First, each RAB develops a mission statement describing its 
overall purpose and goals. Second, each RAB establishes a set of operating procedures 
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that govern meetings, membership terms, methods of dispute resolution, participation of 
the public in meetings, and how the RAB addresses public comments. Third, points-of- 
contact for cleanup information are identified at the installation level, normally the BEC, 
and higher in the chain-of-command. Fourth, information on cleanup activities, such as 
draft and final technical documents, proposed and final plans, and status reports, are 
provided to the RAB and made available to the public in a timely manner. Finally, 
vehicles for disseminating information, such as public meetings, bulletins, and central 
repositories, are identified and used consistently. 
Initially, policies were not developed on how to adjourn a RAB once it had been 
established, but in 1998, an interim adjournment policy was published. It stated that 
adjournment of a RAB might be appropriate if one of three circumstances is met: an 
installation completes its environmental restoration program; or, an installation has all 
remedies in place and the remedies are operating properly; or, there is no longer sustained 
community interest. (DoD, 1998) 
Once established, the RAB fulfills many responsibilities. These responsibilities, 
according to the Management Guidance for the Defense Environmental Restoration 
Program (1998, p. 31) include: 
1. providing advice to the installation, EPA, state regulatory agency, and other 
government agencies on environmental restoration activities and community 
involvement, 
2. addressing important issues related to environmental restoration, such as risk 
information, scope of studies, cleanup levels, waste management, and 
remedial action alternatives, 
3. reviewing documents associated with environmental restoration activities, such 
as plans and technical reports, 
4. providing advice on proposed environmental restoration projects to be 
accomplished in the next fiscal year and beyond, 
5. providing advice on priorities among sites or projects, 
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6. conducting regular meetings that are open to the public and scheduled at times 
and locations that are convenient for community members, 
7. documenting discussions at meetings, and making the information available to 
repositories, and 
8. interacting with the LRA or other land use planning bodies to discuss future 
land use issues relevant to environmental restoration decision-making. 
Additionally, the Base Reuse Implementation Manual {1991, pp. F-13-F-14) states 
that a RAB will: 
1. act as a forum for discussion and exchange of cleanup information between 
Government agencies and the public; 
2. develop and maintain a mailing list of names and addresses of stakeholders 
who wish to receive information on the cleanup program; 
3. identify applicable standards and, consistent with Section 121 of the 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act 
(CERCLA), propose remedies consistent with planned land use. 
Apart from the overall responsibilities of the RAB, the DoD Installation Co-chair, 
Community Co-chair, RAB community members, federal and state regulatory agency 
members, and BCT members fulfill additional responsibilities.   As the DoD 
representative, the DoD Installation Co-chair should: 
1. ... coordinate with the Community Co-chair to prepare and distribute an 
agenda prior to each RAB meeting. If the RAB will address restoration 
related to base closure activities, the DoD and Community Co-chair should 
coordinate with the BRAC Cleanup Team, the Base Transition Coordinator, 
and the reuse committee. 
2. ... ensure that DoD participates in an open and constructive manner. 
3. .. .attend all meetings and ensure the RAB has the opportunity to participate in 
the restoration decision process. 
4. ... ensure that community issues and concerns related to restoration are 
addressed when raised. 
5. ... provide relevant policies and guidance documents to the RAB in order to 
enhance the RAB's operation. 
6. ... ensure that adequate administrative support to meet the RAB is provided. 
7. .. .refer issues not related to restoration to appropriate installation official for 
them to address. 
8. ...report back to the installation. (Base Reuse Implementation Manual (1997 
pp. F-53-F-55) 
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The Community Co-chair should: 
1. ... coordinate with the DoD Installation Co-chair and RAB community 
members to prepare an agenda prior to each RAB meeting. 
2. ... ensure that community members participate in an open and constructive 
manner 
3. ... ensure that community issues and concerns related to restoration are raised. 
4. ... assist with the dissemination of information to the general public. 
5. ... report RAB back to the community. 
6. .. .serve without compensation. {Base Reuse Implementation Manual (1997, 
pp. F-53-F-55) 
RAB community members are expected to: 
1. ... attend meetings. 
2. ... provide advice and comment on restoration issues to the decision makers. 
3. ... serve without compensation on the RAB. {Base Reuse Implementation 
Manual (1997, pp. F-53-F-55) 
Additionally, RAB community members should: 
1. ... represent and communicate community interests and concerns to the RAB. 
2. ... act as a conduit for the exchange of information between the community, 
DoD installation, and environmental oversight agencies regarding the 
installation's restoration and reuse programs. 
3. .. .review, evaluate, and comment on documents and other such materials 
related to installation restoration and closure, where applicable. {Base Reuse 
Implementation Manual (1997, pp. F-53-F-55) 
Federal (EPA) and state regulatory agency members should: 
1. ...attendmeetings. 
2. ... serve as an information, referral, and resource bank for communities, 
installations and agencies regarding installation restoration. 
3. ... review documents and other materials related to restoration, 
4. ... ensure that federal and/or state environmental standards and regulations are 
identified and addressed by the DoD installation. 
5. ... facilitate flexible and innovative resolutions of environmental issues and 
concerns. 
6. ... assist in education and training for the RAB members. {Base Reuse 
Implementation Manual {\991, pp. F-53-F-55) 
The BCT should: 
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1. ... maintain a close working relationship with other members of the RAB. 
2. ... provide timely and accurate information to the RAB. (Base Reuse 
Implementation Manual (1997, pp. F-53-F-55) 
F.        DIFFICULTIES IMPLEMENTING THE FAST-TRACK CLEANUP 
PROGRAM AND OPERATING RESTORATION ADVISORY BOARDS 
From the Restoration Advisory Board Report to Congress (1995), the Defense 
Environmental Response Task Force (DERTF) shifted its focus from establishing RABs 
to operating RABs by establishing basic procedures for reviewing and responding to 
public comment, keeping the community informed, and determining methods for 
resolution of disputes. Additional initiatives undertaken in FY95 included: 
1. Developing the Directory of Restoration Advisory Boards, 
2. Beginning the collection of material for a RAB resource book that will provide 
practical tools for establishing and operating RABs, and 
3. Publishing a notice of request in the Federal Register for comments about 
funding options for technical assistance for public. 
As reported in Fast-Track Cleanup: Successes and Challenges, 1993-1995 
(1996), a report prepared by the Office of the Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of 
Defense (Environmental Cleanup), BCTs were established and BRAG Cleanup Plans 
were completed at 77 closed installations nine months after the presidential plan was 
announced. In contrast, GAO reported in Military Bases: Environmental Impact at 
Closing Installations (1995), that according to a review of 77 cleanup plans, about one- 
third of the installations had not yet formed a RAB. Additionally, at installations with a 
RAB, only half of them participated in developing the BRAC cleanup plans. GAO 
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(1995) also reported that EPA, in a similar effort to establish advisory boards, had not 
been able to earn the public's trust due to differing interests, even with the best intentions 
and community outreach programs. Based on GAO's observations at selected RAB 
meetings, it appeared that DoD might face similar difficulties. 
Other problems facing the Fast-Track Cleanup Program are empowerment of 
BCTs, a lack of baseline data, and inadequate performance measures. Even though BCTs 
exist at closing bases to make environmental cleanup decisions and develop cleanup 
plans, approval of these decisions comes from above the base level. As of December 
1994, the only two measures of effectiveness were the percentage of closing bases with 
completed environmental impact analysis, and the percentage of property at closing bases 
that could be made available for reuse. (GAO/NSIAD-95-70, 1995) 
Recognizing the need for better methods of progress assessment, DoD presented 
five Measures of Merit (MOM) at a DERTF meeting in May 1996. The first of these 
MOMs is relative risk categorization. DoD developed the relative risk methodology to 
provide a stable and quantifiable basis for justifying requirements and allocating funds. 
This ensures that DoD is able to direct the necessary resources to sites that pose the 
greatest risk. Relative risk is categorized as High, Medium, Low, Not Evaluated, or Not 
Required. This MOM tracks both site counts and funding for each relative risk category. 
Second, progress through the phases of the cleanup program is tracked. All sites are 
tracked from the investigation phase, through the cleanup phase, and finally to the 
"Response Complete" or "No Further Action Required" categories. The third MOM is 
milestones accomplished; these milestones are actions taken toward reducing the relative 
environmental risk that previous military activities imparted to a site. Fourth, the number 
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of installations with final remedial actions in place or all cleanup activities complete is 
counted. Finally, the number of acres suitable for transfer under CERCLA is determined. 
Since no method has been developed to project the number of acres that will be 
transferable in a given year, this MOM provides a current and retrospective look at the 
condition of property. (Defense Environmental Response Task Force, 1997) 
G.  FORT ORD RESTORATION ADVISORY BOARD 
Established in 1917, Fort Ord served as both an infantry training facility and as a 
staging location for infantry troops throughout its history. Fort Ord was home to various 
units with the 7th Infantry Division occupying it since 1975. As part of the Base 
Realignment and Closure (BRAC) Commission's second round of closings, the 
announcement of Fort Ord's closure came April 1991. In September 1994, Fort Ord 
officially closed and eliminated 13,600 military and 2,835 civilian jobs (California Trade 
and Commerce Agency, 1999). 
At the time of its closure, Fort Ord covered 28,000 acres. The Federal 
government retained 15,000 acres, which included the Presidio of Monterey Annex 
military housing units and land for future transfer to the Bureau of Land Management. 
With the Federal government retaining over half of the installation, 13,000 acres 
remained available for transfer through Public Benefit Conveyance (PBC) or Economic 
Development Conveyance (EDC). The conveyances differ because of the uses for the 
land and the cost of the land to the new landowner. The land must be used for specific 
purposes in a PBC and is transferred to the new user at no cost. Examples of agencies or 
groups eligible for PBCs include Federal Aviation Administration, educational 
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institutions, or organizations that assist the homeless. In an EDC, as the name implies, 
the land is to be used for business purposes and is sold by the Federal government at a 
negotiated price. 
As of February 1999, approximately 3,000 acres have been transferred. Most of 
the transfers have been through PBC to include California State University Monterey 
Bay, Marina Municipal Airport (formerly Fritzche Army Air Field), and several homeless 
organizations. The one significant EDC was the sale of two golf courses to the city of 
Seaside for $11 million. Despite these transfers, almost 10,000 acres remained available 
for transfer five years after Fort Ord closed. The extensive environmental cleanup 
required at Fort Ord was partially responsible for the slow rate of transfer. (California 
Trade and Commerce Agency, 1999) 
The environmental cleanup effort at Fort Ord began before the installation 
officially closed. In 1990, Fort Ord appeared on the EPA's National Priorities List 
because of groundwater contamination from the landfills located on the installation. As 
mandated by Title 10 USC Section 2705, a Technical Review Committee (TRC) formed 
to investigate the extent of the contamination and to develop a corrective action plan. 
Representatives from the Department of the Army, EPA, and California EPA comprised 
the Fort Ord TRC. In total, there were 30 members on the TRC. In 1991, the Army 
conducted a base-wide investigation and submitted its Record of Decision, or cleanup 
plan, to the EPA in January 1994. (RAB Meeting Minutes, 07 February 1994) 
According to the Fort OrdBRAC Cleanup Plan Abstract for FY97 (1997), the 
BCT was formed in September 1993. In compliance with the Fast-Track Cleanup 
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Program, the BCT conducted a "bottom-up" review of the BRAC Cleanup Plan and 
completed its review in March 1994. 
February 1994, the Army held an open meeting to explain the purpose and 
responsibilities of a RAB and to request interested persons submit applications to become 
RAB members. During the meeting, the Army representative announced that seven local 
mayors and two Monterey County Board of Supervisors representatives had selected the 
first Community Co-chair. A selection committee would establish criteria for reviewing 
applications to select 12 primary and six alternates to serve as RAB community members. 
The selection committee consisted of the Community Co-chair, representatives from the 
U.S. and California EPA, and two current TRC members. The material presented below 
is meant to serve as an overview of some of the problems faced by the Fort Ord RAB; a 
more extensive analysis of these problems is provided in Chapter IV. 
The Fort Ord RAB held its first meeting with its new community members in 
May 1994. According to the minutes, the community members consisted of the 
Community Co-chair, three representatives from two environmental groups, a retired 
teacher, a former city council member, a retired Monterey County Health Department 
worker, a college student, and four individual citizens. The agenda for this meeting was 
to discuss RAB responsibilities and to draft a mission statement. During the meeting, the 
Community Co-chair requested that all RAB members operate openly and without hidden 
agendas. 
Based on interviews of RAB members, review of RAB meeting minutes, and 
newspaper articles, the Fort Ord RAB faced many conflicts, both internal and external, 
throughout its tenure. In attempts to resolve internal conflicts, the Fort Ord RAB 
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employed outside facilitation groups on three separate occasions. The first group, 
Conflict Resolution and Mediation Center of Monterey County, began to assist the Fort 
Ord RAB in February 1996 at the request of a local Army commander. To facilitate 
meetings, parliamentary procedures at RAB meetings were employed. RAB members 
were given copies of Robert's Rules of Order to assist in this endeavor. In July 1996, a 
question of privilege was raised before the Fort Ord RAB because a member was 
dismissed, in accordance with RAB by-laws, for missing three meetings. This individual 
missed these meetings because of a personal illness, and a motion was made to reinstate 
this individual to the RAB. Other RAB members defeated the motion citing that there 
were no provisions in the by-laws to reinstate members. Shortly after this incident, the 
neutrality of the Conflict Resolution and Mediation Center of Monterey County was 
questioned at which time they ceased to provide assistance to the Fort Ord RAB. 
At the request of U.S. EPA, Career/Pro began to provide facilitation services in 
February 1997. From comments in meeting minutes, the Fort Ord RAB was making 
progress. One member of the RAB stated that she was glad to see RAB members talk 
"to" each other instead of "at" each other. Any progress that was made ended in 
September 1997 when a dispute erupted between Army RAB representatives and 
community RAB members over the September agenda. Career/Pro managed to broker a 
compromise, but because of conscious and deliberate acts by a RAB member, important 
presentations concerning cleanup were not made (Houghton, 1997). Because of these 
actions Career/Pro recommended to disband the Fort Ord RAB in October 1997. 
In September 1998, Concur, a third facilitation group, began to assist the Fort Ord 
RAB at the request of U.S. EPA. Concur conducted special meetings with the RAB prior 
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to scheduled monthly meetings. Again, progress was being made, but the inability to 
establish selection criteria for new members and a motion to resolve the question of 
privilege from 1996 caused the RAB to relapse. After seven months, Concur made its 
recommendation to disband the Fort Ord RAB in May 1999. 
External conflicts also plagued the RAB. The most notable was the lawsuit filed 
by a RAB member representing an environmental group against the Army, which was 
then adjudicated by another RAB member. The Army settled the lawsuit by agreeing to 
follow CERCLA procedures in its cleanup of unexploded ordnance, a process that could 
delay the transfer of land up to two years. 
May 1999, the Army announced its decision concerning the Fort Ord RAB. 
Citing the RAB's ineffectiveness in providing a forum for the exchange of information 
and lack of timely advice regarding the environmental cleanup at Fort Ord, the Army, 
with the support of OSD, Headquarters Department of the Army, and the BCT, disbanded 
the Fort Ord RAB. 
H.       SUMMARY 
This chapter provides information necessary to understand why the President's 
Revitalization Initiative was needed, gives an overview of the Five-Point Plan with 
emphasis placed on the Fast-Track Cleanup Program and the RAB process, and details 
the implementation of the RAB process at Fort Ord. This background knowledge is 
necessary to understand the difficulties advisory groups have when trying to provide 
input on a technical matter, such as environmental cleanup. 
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m. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The advisory nature of a Restoration Advisory Board creates some unique 
circumstances that must be studied. To provide a conceptual framework for analyzing 
the general RAB process and the Fort Ord RAB in particular, literature concerning citizen 
involvement, autonomy of advisory groups, expectations versus reality of advisory group 
participants, and group conflict resolution were reviewed. 
A.       CITIZEN INVOLVEMENT 
Citizen participation to advise in planning and implementing social programs is 
not new. Since the 1960s, citizen participation in the form of citizen advisory groups, 
neighborhood councils, and planning commissions has been used to differing degrees of 
success. Debate about the value of citizen participation increased greatly with the 
Economic Recovery Act of 1964 and its "maximum feasible participation" clause 
(Rosner, 1978). This clause stated that programs would be "... developed, conducted, and 
administered with the maximum participation of the residents of the areas and members 
of the groups served." (Economic Recovery Act, 1964) 
Rosner (1978) notes that researchers are not in agreement about the goals and 
objectives of citizen participation, or the ability to evaluate its effectiveness. Despite this 
uncertainty, federal funds are continually allocated to citizen participation programs, such 
as restoration advisory boards. 
According to Kweit and Kweit (1987), there is no place for citizen participation in 
the ideal bureaucracy. The authors' believe that citizens lack technical expertise, are 
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unfamiliar with bureaucratic routines, and may be emotionally involved in the issues of 
concern. Additionally, there is little control over citizens since they are outside the 
bureaucratic hierarchy, which may increase the level of conflict between citizens and 
bureaucrats and the time needed to reach decisions. The final result may hamper the 
efficiency and rationality sought in the ideal bureaucracy. 
"Despite hundreds of federal regulations and the expenditure of millions of 
dollars, participation procedures, such as public hearings and advisory committees, are 
more often wasteful and useless." (Cohen, 1995, p. 121) Installation representatives and 
state and Federal regulators must spend time attending RAB meetings, and the 
installation must provide administrative support and funding to operate the RAB (DoD, 
1998). 
Other problems that can plague advisory groups are the credibility of its members 
and high turnover rates experienced by citizen participation groups. According to Cohen 
(1995), an advisory group's efforts are enhanced if members represent advocacy groups 
with significant clout and resources. If the members are unrepresentative, their decisions 
might be discounted and biased. Kweit and Kweit (1980) state that the credibility of 
group members is higher if their perceived level of expertise is high, they are able to 
participate in the bureaucratic process without causing excess delays, and they are 
perceived as potentially supportive of the sponsoring agency. 
According to English (1972), recruitment and high turnover rates are problems 
encountered by citizen participation groups. Rather than being bombarded with people 
interested in serving, citizen groups often find membership recruitment difficult and 
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suffer significant attrition. English (1972) provides several explanations for these 
problems: 
1. Citizens join for personal gain only to lose interest after discovering that it is 
illegal for a board member or immediate family to gain materially from board 
actions. 
2. Citizens joining a board with the intent of obtaining employment on the 
supporting staff are successful and must resign from the board due to resulting 
conflict of interest; or are unsuccessful and leave the board because of lack of 
interest. 
3. Citizens who are interested in joining are prevented from serving because of 
laws regarding conflicts of interest. 
4. Agency appointees, who have no interest in participating, simply do not attend 
meetings. 
5. Members may quit in protest, leave the geographic area, or have more pressing 
personal matters. 
According to Cohen (1995), the role of the advisory group in the decision-making 
process is also important to the success of the group. Participation programs that give the 
illusion of importance but merely placate citizens are likely to reduce trust between 
citizens and the sponsoring agency, diminish communication, cause alienation, and 
possibly foster community opposition. Coinciding with the role of an advisory group is 
the point in the process when an advisory group provides its recommendations. If the 
group merely reacts to proposals formalized by the sponsoring agency, the advisory 
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group is less likely to change the plan than if the group provides advice before proposals 
are finalized. 
The degree of trust between the advisory group and the sponsoring agency can 
greatly impact the manner in which formalized plans are received. If the level of trust is 
substantial, formalized plans can be more readily received, and the decision-making 
process expedited. However, a lack of trust can cause any proposal submitted by the 
sponsoring agency to be met with suspicion, impeding or blocking the decision-making 
process until petty arguments are resolved. Kweit and Kweit (1980) make a related 
observation that bureaucrats can significantly reduce citizen impact by creating boards 
composed of disinterested citizens or specifying that participation is "advisory" only. 
Kweit and Kweit (1980) also state that the stability or instability of the 
environment surrounding the issue impacts how the sponsoring agency views citizen 
participation. If the environment is stable with little opposition, bureaucrats are less 
likely to incur the costs of citizen participation. Bureaucrats are more likely to incur the 
costs of integrating citizens into the decision-making process if the environment is 
unstable with substantial opposition towards the issue. 
As discussed, the use of citizen participation increases the cost of the decision- 
making process by increasing the time involved and the expense of supporting an 
advisory group, but there are also incentives for bureaucrats to involve citizens. Kweit 
and Kweit (1987) state that the development and cultivation of a clientele is a useful 
device for providing political support for programs when budget resources are scarce. 
Additionally, a good way to develop a clientele is to co-opt citizens by involving them in 
the decision-making process. As defined in The American Heritage Dictionary of the 
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English Language (1981), co-opting can range from electing as a member of a group to 
taking over an independent minority or movement through assimilation into an 
established group or culture. Kweit and Kweit do not define their meaning of co-opt in 
their 1987 article. The amount of autonomy given to citizen participants may determine 
which definition of co-optation may be applied to a particular advisory group. 
B.       AUTONOMY 
Houghton (1988) describes citizen participation in the framework of an advisory 
group as ineffective. In contrast, other authors believe that citizen participation can range 
from empty rituals to significant exercises of power with positive and negative results 
(Knaap, Matier, and Olshansky, 1998). Some researchers believe that the level of 
autonomy the citizen group achieves from its sponsoring agency determines its level of 
success. Autonomy is defined by Houghton (1988) as the degree to which advisory 
groups both challenge their sponsoring agency in areas of direct concern to them and also 
procure their own sources of information and support. 
Houghton (1988) measured autonomy using four categories. First, the methods 
board members used to challenge the sponsoring agency in areas of direct concern to 
them. In other words, could the board veto or amend recommendations of the sponsoring 
agency. Second, he asked board members to rate the importance of budget, agency 
structure, administrative regulation, and staffing for inclusion on the agenda of the board. 
His findings showed that boards with more control over these items were more 
autonomous. Third is the degree to which boards collected their own information. 
Sources of information include formal surveys, public records, conferences, or 
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independent experts. Houghton found that boards that did not rely on their sponsoring 
agency for all technical information were more autonomous. Finally, Houghton 
determined what actions boards take to solicit support for their recommendations. 
Boards that gathered information to formulate recommendations, and then solicited 
support for these recommendations were more autonomous. From this research, 
Houghton concluded that citizen advisory boards could have an impact on policy if then- 
members engage in activities designed to enhance their independence from the 
sponsoring agency. 
According to Knaap, Matier, and Olshansky (1998), another measure of 
autonomy is an advisory board's ability to broadly represent the community. Although 
advisory groups may include citizens-at-large, groups not representative of their 
community limit their ability to provide viable recommendations to the sponsoring 
agency. To better represent the community, advisory groups should seek representatives 
of minority populations and neighborhood groups. Advisory groups may include 
representatives of special interest groups that are active in agency business without the 
inducements of special involvement programs. 
C.   EXPECTATIONS VERSUS REALITY 
To evaluate citizen participation, it is relevant to determine whether a 
participation program or activity is perceived as an end in itself, as a means to an end, or 
a combination of both. In the «healthiest" advisory groups, according to Rosner (1978), 
both the sponsoring agency and the citizen participants agree on the goals of the 
participation process, i.e., a cause and effect relationship between the participation 
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process and the accomplishment of the desired goals is explicit. In this case, the 
participation process is a means to an end. Contrary to the previous situation, if there is 
no agreement about the goals and a lack of consensus concerning cause and effect, the 
participation process is an end in itself. This latter situation is similar to the co-optation 
previously described by Kweit and Kweit. 
Persons selected to participate need to be instructed about what is expected of * 
them, what difficulties and frustrations are likely, and how they can be effective. The 
sponsoring agency should teach citizen participants about the bureaucratic process, while 
citizen participants should be teaching bureaucrats about the social and political 
constraints in the community. The process chosen to select an advisory group affects 
how it works and what it accomplishes. The selection process should be tailored to the 
goals being attempted through the use of an advisory group. A balanced approach to 
evaluating citizen participation needs to include determining what the expectations of 
both the sponsoring agency and citizens in the process are and how fully the results of 
that process fulfilled their expectations. (Plumlee, Starling, and Kramer, 1985) 
D.       CONFLICT 
Thomas (1992) defines conflict as a process that begins when one party perceives 
that another party has negatively affected, or is about to negatively affect, something that 
the first party cares about. Thomas also describes three general properties shared by 
differing definitions of conflict. First, there is an interdependence between the parties in 
the sense that each has the potential to interfere with the other. Second, there is the 
perception by at least one of the parties that there is some degree of opposition or 
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incompatibility among the goals of the parties. Finally, there is some form of interaction 
between the parties. 
Thomas (1992) states that conflict occurs as a process or series of events based on 
structural conditions. The structural conditions shape what Thomas calls conflict 
episodes, which lead to conflict outcomes. The events in the conflict process are 
awareness, thoughts and emotions, intentions, behavior, interaction, and outcomes. 
Awareness is when one of the parties recognizes conflict exists. Thomas goes on 
to describe three forms of conflict. First, goal conflicts involve apparently incompatible 
ends desired by each of the parties. Second, judgement conflicts entail differences over 
empirical or factual issues. Finally, normative conflicts center on one party's evaluation 
of another parry's behavior versus the expectations of how the other should behave. 
After a party becomes aware of conflict, it is experienced in terms ofthat person's 
thoughts that assist in making sense of the conflict and consider ways of dealing with it, 
as well as emotions that interact with those thoughts. 
Prior to behaviors, the decision to act in a given way intervenes. Thomas plots 
these intentions along two axes, assertiveness and cooperativeness. Assertiveness is the 
extent to which an individual attempts to satisfy his/her own concerns, while 
cooperativeness is the extent to which an individual attempts to satisfy the other's 
concerns. Varying degrees of assertiveness and cooperativeness yield different conflict 
management styles. 
The styles Thomas describes are Competing, Accommodating, Compromising, 
Collaborating, and Avoiding. Competing, for example, is assertive but uncooperative 
where one individual attempts to prevail over the other, creating a win-lose outcome. 
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Another example is Accommodating, which is cooperative but unassertive, where the 
desire is to satisfy the other's concerns while ignoring one's own concerns. The ideal 
style in many situations is Collaborating, i.e., individuals are assertive and cooperative, 
and concerns of both parties are satisfied. 
Behaviors are the statements or other observable actions an individual makes 
during a conflict episode. The other individual, who goes through their own conflict 
process, responds to these behaviors based on their own dominant style. This interaction 
between individual styles continues, providing each party with varying degrees of 
conflict resolution. 
The purpose Of a conflict episode is to arrive at some form of a conflict outcome. 
The outcome involves the decision, or lack of decision between parties regarding the 
conflict issue. Thomas (1992) asserts that the principal parties do most conflict 
management themselves, unassisted by third parties. Providing the principal parties are 
effective in resolving their own conflicts, the need for third-party intervention is reduced. 
The ability to resolve conflict in this manner contributes to an organization's welfare by 
producing more effective conflict outcomes, and by saving an organization costs in terms 
of time and money by not having to involve third parties. If the principal parties cannot 
arrive at an acceptable outcome, involvement of a third party may be necessary, i.e., two 
highly competitive styles may need facilitation towards collaboration. 
Robbins (1992) describes conflicts as functional or dysfunctional. Functional 
conflicts support the goals of the group and improve performance, while dysfunctional 
conflicts hinder group performance and can be destructive. Constructive conflict 
improves the quality of decisions, stimulates creativity and innovation, encourages 
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interest and curiosity among group members, provides the medium through which 
problems can be aired and tensions released, and fosters an environment of self- 
evaluation and change. 
If left uncontrolled, Robbins (1992) states that dysfunctional conflict retards 
communication, reduces group cohesiveness, and subordinates group goals to the 
primacy of infighting among members. "At the extreme, conflict can bring group 
functioning to a halt and potentially threaten the group's survival." (Robbins, 1992, 
p. 184) 
E.        SUMMARY 
The literature describes some of the challenges citizen advisory groups face and 
how they can minimize problems or enhance effectiveness (e.g., increased autonomy). 
Five hypotheses are presented to analyze the RAB process and the Fort Ord RAB. First, 
the more knowledge an advisory group has about bureaucratic processes and the technical 
aspects of environmental cleanup, the more likely they are to establish credibility with 
bureaucrats and effectively fulfill their advisory role. Second, as an advisory group 
minimizes membership turnover, more time is available to spend on pertinent issues. 
Third, (using Houghton's definition of autonomy) the more autonomous the advisory 
group is from its sponsoring agency, the more likely the advisory group is to effectively 
fulfill their advisory role. Fourth, the greater the alignment of expectations and trust 
between citizen participants and the sponsoring agency, the more likely the advisory 
group is to effectively fulfill their advisory role. Finally, an advisory group that is able to 
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produce meaningful conflict outcomes, either among the primary members or with 
assistance from a third party, is more likely to effectively fulfill their advisory role. 
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IV. RESULTS 
A.        METHODOLOGY 
Several methods were used to obtain data to evaluate the hypotheses from Chapter 
III. These included reviewing archives of Fort Ord Restoration Advisory Board (RAB) 
meeting minutes, attending four Fort Ord RAB meetings, and conducting interviews with 
both members of the Fort Ord RAB and other people associated with the Fort Ord RAB. 
Meeting minutes were easily accessible, as several public repositories were available. 
Fort Ord RAB meetings were open to the public and easily attended. These meetings 
were scheduled monthly on the second Tuesday at a standard time and location. 
Semi-structured interviews were conducted in-person and via telephone with two 
Army leaders responsible for the transfer of Fort Ord land, an Army environmental 
cleanup specialist, representatives from U.S. and California EPA, two citizen members of 
the RAB, the BRAC Transition Coordinator (BTC), and one of the facilitators that 
assisted the RAB. For the purposes of this chapter, those interviewed were placed into 
the following groups: Group 1 was Army leaders and Army environmental cleanup 
specialist, Group 2 was regulatory agency representatives, Group 3 was citizen members 
of the RAB, and Group 4 was the BTC and facilitator that assisted the RAB. 
Due to time constraints, each interview began with verbal administration of a 
structured questionnaire (see Appendix A). The questions addressed the effectiveness 
factors identified in the literature review. Initial answers to questions were based on a 
five-point Likert scale where 1 = "low" on the characteristic being examined and 5 = 
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"high". The exception was Question 11, which was based on a three-point scale. If time 
permitted, follow-on questions were asked to gain more in-depth information. Of nine 
interviews conducted, five were in-person and four via telephone and follow-on questions 
were asked in 78 percent of all interviews. To gain further insight into the workings of 
the RAB, the author presented two open questions just prior to the conclusion of each 
interview. Each interviewee was asked what primary factors facilitated RAB successes 
and what primary factors impeded RAB successes. 
Obtaining interviews with members of the RAB was difficult because of events 
that occurred just prior to the requests for interviews. With approval from the Office of 
the Secretary of Defense and U.S. EPA, and with the concurrence of the current 
facilitation group, the Army disbanded the Fort Ord RAB in May 1999. Many citizen 
members declined an interview because of the controversial nature of the disbanding of 
the RAB. Others declined to be interviewed until they could discuss their possible 
participation with other citizen members. Members representing government regulatory 
agencies hesitated to participate because they did not want their input construed as the 
opinion of the agency they represented. Some regulatory members agreed to an interview 
after being reassured that they would not be directly quoted. A promise of anonymity 
was given to all interviewees and in-person interviews were recorded with the 
interviewee's permission. 
B.        CITIZEN INVOLVEMENT 
To gather data regarding the importance of citizen involvement, the following 
four questions were asked. 
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Frequencies of Question Ratings 
Not Necessary Essential 
12 3 4 5 
Question: How important is citizen 
participation in the environmental 
cleanup process at Fort Ord? 0 0 2 2 5 
Both members of Group 4 rated citizen participation as the midpoint value (3), 
one member of Group 1 and one member of Group 2 rated the question as (4), and two 
members of Group 1, one member of Group 2, and both members of Group 3 responded 
Essential (5). While all of the interviewees agreed the need for citizen involvement 
exists, they did not agree on the reason why. 
Responses from representatives of all groups expressed the need for openness 
between the Army and the surrounding community, the ability to determine the 
perceptions of the local community, and for citizens to have input into what affects their 
community. Before the RAB was established, there was the impression that very little if 
any community outreach existed and establishing the RAB demonstrated that the 
government was willing to open the process to the public and not operate in a vacuum. 
Two Group 1 representatives stated that citizen participation was required by CERCLA 
and that the land would inevitably be turned over to the community. One Group 2 
representative stated that if the cleanup process followed the strict guidelines of 
CERCLA, the needs of the community might be completely overlooked. One Group 3 
member simply said that the Army could not be trusted to provide adequate cleanup 
without citizen involvement. 
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Frequencies of Question Ratings 
Not at All All Major Groups 
12 3 4 5 Question: To what extent do you 
think the RAB represents all major 
citizen groups? 4 4 10 0 
Four of the nine interviewees, two Group 1 and two Group 4 members, stated that 
the representation of major citizen groups was Not at All (1), another four, one Group 1, 
two Group 2, and one Group 3, stated representation as Less Than Half (2), and one 
Group 3 member stated About Half(3) of the major citizen groups were represented. 
Members involved with the Fort Ord RAB since its inception stated that 
representation was better in the beginning, but diminished for several reasons. First, 
arguments over procedural details eventually drove out old members and caused new 
members to quickly become disillusioned with the process and quit. Second, the 
increased investment of time caused by procedural arguments became too great for some 
members. At one point, it was not uncommon for meetings to last for over four hours. 
For example, one meeting attended by the author took 45 minutes to agree on the agenda 
for that night's meeting. Unfortunate ramifications from these procedural arguments 
were that community comments and concerns were not heard because people left before 
public comment periods began and technical presentations meant to inform the public 
were either cancelled or presented to RAB members. Third, businesses and cities 
surrounding the former Fort Ord were never represented on the RAB. The surrounding 
cities were represented on the Fort Ord Reuse Authority (FORA) Board, which dealt with 
land distribution issues. Finally, membership on the Fort Ord RAB expanded and 
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contracted, but membership eventually stabilized with the same few members 
representing their agendas, which did not necessarily expedite the cleanup process. 
The Fort Ord RAB encountered membership problems from the very beginning. 
From a meeting held in February 1994 and ads placed in local newspapers, only 19 
people submitted applications to join the RAB. From these 19 applications, the selection 
committee selected 11 primary citizen members. Local city mayors and the Monterey 
County Board of Supervisors selected the first Community Co-chair. Before the end of 
the first year, the Army Co-chair changed, the Community Co-chair moved out of the 
area, one member resigned due to family matters, and one member was dropped because 
of missed meetings. 
The RAB, which began in 1994 with a total of 36 members, was only mustering 
11 to 16 members by the end of 1995. Because of declining membership, a selection 
committee was established in February 1995 to develop procedures to select new 
members. By November 1995, selection procedures still were not developed so the 
selection committee was disbanded and all applicants were accepted. At this point, 
membership grew to 50 members, but this did not last long. In March 1996, two original 
members said that they would not be renewing their membership because they were tired 
of the bickering among RAB members and the perception of being ignored by the Army. 
Another member resigned in September 1996 after being selected for a position on the 
Army Community Relations staff. Throughout the remainder of 1996,1997, and 1998, 
membership slowly declined. By February 1999, only 11 members were consistently 
attending meetings. On occasion, as few as eight members would attend a scheduled 
monthly meeting. 
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Frequencies of Question Ratings 
Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree 
12 3 4 5 
Question: Necessary training was 
provided to the RAB members. 2 2 113 
Both Group 3 members responded Strongly Disagree (1). One Group 1 member 
and one Group 2 member responded Somewhat Disagree (2). Group 2 and Group 1 
representatives gave responses of Neither Agree nor Disagree (3) and Somewhat Agree 
(4), respectively. The three Strongly Agree (5) responses came from one member of 
Group 1 and both members of Group 4. 
A comprehensive series of lectures provided in 1994 covered aspects of 
environmental cleanup, risk assessment, groundwater aquifers, and the CERCLA 
Superfund process. Additionally, the first mediation group provided training in the 
parliamentary process based on Robert 's Rules of Order. Based on the response of a 
Group 2 representative, over $250,000 were spent on training provided by Concur, the 
third facilitation group, to assist the RAB in resolving their differences. No additional 
technical training other than technical presentations at monthly meetings was provided to 
new members and no follow-on training was provided to previous members. By the time 
the Fort Ord RAB was disbanded, only two members received the earlier series of 
lectures. One Group 3 member stated that after the initial set of lectures it was the RAB 
member's responsibility to obtain additional training. 
From multiple Group 1 and Group 2 members, two common themes emerged. It 
was an unreasonable expectation to teach laypersons something as technical as 
environmental cleanup and that even after training and technical presentations, some 
citizen members never reached an effective level of understanding. Even one Group 3 
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member stated that a RAB member must come in with some level of technical knowledge 
to understand the process. 
In an attempt to streamline lengthy meetings, the Conflict Resolution and 
Mediation Center of Monterey County conducted a seminar on parliamentary procedures 
using Robert 's Rules of Order as the primary teaching tool in February 1996. While this 
appeared to work at first, Robert's Rules became a tool to intimidate those who were not 
comfortable with parliamentary processes. 
The need for training did not rest solely with the citizen members of the RAB. 
The BTC stated that government employees who were going to be placed into positions 
where they dealt with the public, especially on issues as potentially emotional as 
environmental cleanup, should receive training in crisis communication skills. If this 
type of training was not available, a communication specialist, such as a trained 
facilitator, should be used from the beginning. From personal observations of RAB 
meetings and review of meeting transcripts, citizen members could also benefit from this 
type of training because, on multiple occasions, RAB citizen members openly argued 
among themselves, as well as with members of the community during public comment 
periods. 
Frequencies of Question Ratings 
Empty Ritual Essential 
12 3 4 5 No Response 
Question: How would you 
describe the role of the RAB? 4 110 2 1 
This is how this question appeared on the questionnaire. However, in the 
interview process each respondent was requested to answer in regards to the Fort Ord 
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RAB. Although this question referred to citizen involvement, it was one of the last 
questions asked because of possible resentment and repercussions from the person being 
interviewed. Two Group 1 members, one Group 2 member, and one Group 4 member 
responded Empty Ritual (1). One Group 4 member responded Symbolic (2) and one 
Group 2 member responded Necessary (3). Both Group 3 members responded that the 
role of the Fort Ord RAB was Essential (5). One Group 1 member did not respond to this 
question. Two respondents, one from Group 1 and the other from Group 4, stated that 
some of the current citizen members were radical elements with their own political 
agenda to stop development at the former Fort Ord. One Group 2 representative even 
stated that attending meetings for the last six months was a complete waste of time 
because of the personalities involved. 
When asked what could be done to shift the RAB to a more substantive role, 
several suggestions were given. First, if the medium for citizen involvement continued to 
be a RAB, reduced procedural arguing and the elimination of hostility were necessary to 
allow members to participate openly. Second, a neutral third party should assist in 
establishing by-laws and procedures, and then ensure that they were followed. Third, all 
members should sign a commitment sheet that clearly defines the duties and 
responsibilities of the RAB that clearly stated it was not a decision-making body, but a 
conduit between the military service and the surrounding community, as stated earlier in 
Chapter H. Fourth, attempt to attract people with more technical knowledge about 
environmental cleanup to participate in the process. Finally, move away from the 
concept of a RAB altogether and establish some other forum to provide community 
outreach and involvement. 
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C.       AUTONOMY 
Using indicators of autonomy presented in Chapter HI, questions were asked 
concerning involvement in the environmental cleanup planning process, the "advisory" 
nature of the RAB, control of agenda, and sources of information. 
Frequencies of Question Ratings 
Not Involved Fully Involved 
1 2 3 4 5 No Response 
Question: On average, to what 
extent has the RAB been involved 
in the development of the BRAC 
Cleanup Plan? 4 2 110 1 
Of those that responded, six answered Somewhat Involved (2) or lower. These 
included one Group 1 member, both Group 2 members, one Group 3 member, and both 
Group 4 members. One member of Group 1 responded Moderately Involved (3), one 
member of Group 3 responded Strongly Involved (4), and one Group 1 member did not 
respond to this question. 
Two respondents gave their answer as Not Involved (1) because the cleanup plan 
was already formulated before the RAB existed. Fort Ord was placed on the U.S. EPA 
National Priorities List in 1991 because of groundwater contamination, which required a 
Technical Review Committee to develop a cleanup plan before the formation of the RAB 
in 1994. One Group 1 member stated that the RAB was Fully Involved (5) earlier in the 
cleanup planning process, but lessened to Somewhat Involved (2) in the last two years. 
The Group 1 member that did not provide an answer from the scale said that the RAB did 
not provide much productive input and that meetings evolved into squabbles among 
individuals. One Group 2 member based his response of Somewhat Involved (2) on the 
fact that little of what the RAB provided was within regulatory limits. 
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Frequencies of Question Ratings 
Never or Always or 
Almost Never Almost Always 
„      .      _     , 12 3 4 5 No Response Question: To what extent did the 
BRAC Cleanup Team implement 
RAB recommendations? 5 2 0 10 1 
One Group 1 respondent answered Greater Than Half the Time (4), but clarified 
his answer by saying that was early in the process. As time passed, the RAB provided no 
inputs for the BRAC Cleanup Team to implement. Of the remaining eight interviewees, 
one Group 1 member did not respond to the question while the remainder answered Less 
Than Half the Time (2) or lower. Those that answered Never of Almost Never (1) were 
one Group 1 member, one Group 2 member, both members of Group 3, and one Group 4 
member. 
During the early days of the RAB, both members of Group 2 stated that the RAB 
provided few inputs to the BRAC Cleanup Team, but those inputs were not within legal 
boundaries. Because of the hostile nature of this RAB, members would often times 
provide inputs outside the regular forum of the RAB and directly contact the Army 
Environmental Office. Examples of this type of input were the Safety Alert brochure 
(see Appendix B) and warning signs which were posted in English and Spanish because 
of the large population of Spanish-speaking residents in the area. 
Another method used by individual RAB members to influence cleanup efforts at 
Fort Ord was filing a lawsuit against the Army in 1997. The lawsuit was filed by a 
representative of a local environmental group represented on the Fort Ord RAB, and was 
litigated by the presiding Community Co-chair of the Fort Ord RAB. The lawsuit 
contended that CERCLA cleanup procedures used to cleanup groundwater contamination 
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should also be applied to the cleanup of unexploded ordnance. The major debate focused 
on whether unexploded ordnance was considered hazardous material or hazardous waste. 
The Army argued that unexploded ordnance was a hazardous material. Therefore, 
DoD procedures to locate and properly dispose of unexploded ordnance applied. The 
plaintiffs argued that unexploded ordnance was a hazardous waste, and since Fort Ord 
was already on the National Priorities List, CERCLA procedures applied. Before the 
judge could make a ruling, the Army agreed, in October 1998, to follow CERCLA 
cleanup procedures as they applied at Fort Ord. By agreeing to the conditions of the 
lawsuit, the Army delayed transfer of any Fort Ord land for at least two years so that a 
base wide Remedial Investigation/Feasibility Study (RI/FS) could be conducted under the 
auspices of CERCLA. Additionally, the Army avoided a ruling that could establish a 
precedence applying CERCLA procedures to all unexploded ordnance cleanup projects 
throughout the country. 
Frequencies of Question Ratings 
Strongly Strongly 
Disagree Agree 
12 3 4 5 
Question: The "advisory" nature of 
the RAB (i.e., no decision authority) 
significantly reduces its impact on 
the cleanup effort at Fort Ord 2 3 112 
Two Group 1 members responded Strongly Disagree (1) while the third Group 1 
member, one Group 2 member, and one Group 3 member responded Somewhat Disagree 
(2). Of those remaining, one Group 4 member Neither Agreed nor Disagreed (3), one 
Group 2 member Somewhat Agreed (4), and one Group 3 member and one Group 4 
member Strongly Agreed (5). 
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The Group 2 member that Somewhat Agreed (4) that the RAB's impact was 
reduced also stated that almost any group of laypersons could create problems if they 
held authority over the EPA with regard to technical cleanup issues. One Group 4 
member said that the initial intent of a RAB being "advisory" was a good idea. However, 
that initial intent was lost with the current members of the Fort Ord RAB because they 
saw themselves as a decision-making body, not as a conduit of information to the 
surrounding communities. One Group 3 member stated that the Army did not take the 
RAB serious, which significantly reduced the RAB's impact. 
When asked what could be done to increase the RAB's impact on cleanup efforts, 
one member each from Groups 1,2, and 4 responded that an increase in the technical 
knowledge of environmental cleanup by citizen members would increase the RAB's 
impact. Increased technical knowledge would allow citizen members to formulate 
substantial inputs and establish rational arguments to support these inputs. In its current 
state, a lack of technical knowledge fostered a lack of trust of the Army and regulatory 
agencies, which led to an adversarial relationship among citizen members, the Army, and 
regulatory agencies. 
One Group 3 member felt that since the RAB did not have access to the BRAC 
Cleanup Team (BCT), which is the decision-making body concerning cleanup issues at 
Fort Ord, all cleanup decisions were made before the RAB could provide inputs. He 
stated that better access to the BCT would increase the impact of the RAB. 
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Frequencies of Question Ratings 
Never or Always or 
Almost Never Almost Always 
12 3 4 5 No Response 
Question: The RAB controls 
its own agenda... 11114 1 
The two responses on the lower half of the scale, Never or Almost Never (1) and 
Less than Half the Time (2), were from Group 3 members. The remaining responses 
from Groups 1,2, and 4 ranged from About Half the Time (3) to Always or Almost 
Always (5) with one Group 1 member, both Group 2 members, and one Group 4 member 
in the highest category. One Group 1 member did not respond to the question. 
Many comments from follow-up questions revealed that the RAB had almost 
complete control of the agenda even though one Group 3 representative stated that the 
RAB only controlled non-substantive or procedural matters, and accused the Army of 
undermining the RAB. According to a Group 4 member, the only agenda item required 
by the Army for each meeting was a technical presentation on a cleanup issue to inform 
the public. One Group 1 representative stated that the RAB controlled the agenda to the 
point of dysfunction. The Army had the responsibility of compiling inputs for monthly 
meeting agendas, but inputs were often received late, which meant that members usually 
did not see the agenda until the meeting. Another Group 1 representative stated that 
because of arguments over the agenda, technical presentations were either delayed until 
most of the public left the meeting or cancelled. Finally, one Group 4 member felt that 
the Army relinquished too much control early in the process and could never regain that 
control without being accused of trying to prevent RAB progress. 
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While there is a disagreement about who controlled the agenda, a review of RAB 
meeting minutes showed that there were some items normally discussed on agendas that 
the RAB did not control. These items were the operating budget for the RAB, 
administrative support for the RAB, and location of RAB meetings. According to 
meeting minutes, questions about funding arose as early as August 1994. From what can 
be gathered from meeting minutes, the Army did not provide budget information until 
April 1996. Even then, RAB members did not control how the budget was spent. When 
the RAB was first established, a court reporter was used to provide transcripts of all RAB 
meetings. In April 1995, transcripts were no longer provided. When questioned as to 
why, the Army stated that there was a lack of money to continue using a court reporter to 
transcribe meetings. In January 1998, a motion passed to tape record RAB meetings so 
that members could listen to what was said and compare that to the summary minutes of a 
meeting. Another example of how the lack of budget control affected the RAB arose 
during the October 1994 meeting. A RAB. member requested to hire an independent 
technical advisor to review documents, but was told that there was no money. 
The Army's Environmental Center staff at Fort Ord provided both technical and 
administrative support to the RAB. But some RAB members did not trust the Army or 
anyone who worked for the Army, so the available support was under utilized. 
Another aspect the Army had complete control of was the location of meetings. 
During the final months of the RAB, the Army used this power to limit the length of 
meetings because the room had to be vacated by a specific time. RAB members also 
complained of not having a location where they could hold committee meetings or review 
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documents. The Army stated that Environmental Center spaces could be used, but only 
during normal working hours. 
Frequencies of Question Ratings 
Never or Always or 
Almost Never Almost Always 
12 3 4 5 No Response 
Question: To what extent does the 
RAB gather its own information, 
in addition to the information 
provided by the Army (surveys, 
attend conferences, consult technical 
experts, or consult groups)? 2 2 0 12 2 
The division of answers to this question provided some information. One Group 
1 member, one Group 2 member, and both Group 4 members responded Never or Almost 
Never (1) or Less than Half the Time (2). One Group 2 member responded Greater than 
Half the Time (4) and both Group 3 members responded Always or Almost Always (5). 
Two Group 1 members did not respond to this question. 
The most often mentioned source of outside information was that made available 
through the $50,000 Technical Assistance Grant (TAG) provided to an environmental 
group whose executive director was a member of the RAB. This grant, given to the 
environmental group under CERCLA, was used to hire technical assistants that reviewed 
documents provided by the Army. Since this grant was specifically provided to the 
environmental group, its use was not controlled by the RAB. Finally, some members 





Frequencies of Question Ratings 
Never or Always or 
Almost Never Almost Always 
. 12 3 4 5 No Response Question: To what extent does 
the RAB seek input and support 
from its constituents for its 
recommendations? 5 10 11 1 
Much like the previous question, all Group 1 members, one Group 2 member, and 
both Group 4 members responded Never or Almost Never (1) or Less than Half the Time 
(2) while both Group 3 members responded Greater than Half the Time (4) or Always, 
Almost Always (5). One Group 2 member did not respond to this question. While 
citizen members of the RAB represented small groups, such as Fort Ord Toxics Project 
and Environmental Justice, others were simply individuals with no affiliation to a 
particular group. The only other group represented by citizen members during the last 
years of the RAB was the Monterey County Health Department. 
D.       EXPECTATIONS 
Questions in this section were asked to determine to what extent reality matched 
the expectations of RAB members by examining their understanding of RAB goals. 
Frequencies of Question Ratings 
Strongly Strongly 
Question: The role of RAB 
members (as a group) is clearly 
understood? 
Disagree Agree 
12 3 4 5 
Question: The role of RAB 
members (as individuals) is 
clearly understood? 0 0 0 0 
54 
This question started as a single question asking if the RAB, as a group, clearly 
understood its role in the cleanup effort at Fort Ord. After the first two interviewees 
asked if this question was in reference to the group or the individual, answers to both 
questions were taken, and the previous interviewees were contacted to provide a response 
as an individual member. The results of these questions were quite different. 
When asked if the individual member clearly understood their role as a RAB 
member, all respondents answered Strongly Agree (5). When asked if the RAB as a 
group understood their role, two Group 1 members, one Group 2 member, and one Group 
4 member answered Strongly Disagree (1). One Group 4 member answered Somewhat 
Disagree (2). One Group 2 member and one Group 3 member answered Neither Agree 
nor Disagree (3). Finally, one Group 1 member and one Group 3 member answered 
Somewhat Agree (4). 
The question became, 'If as individuals everyone knew their role, why did the 
group not know its role?" One reason suggested by two Group 1 members was that the 
Fort Ord RAB wanted to be a regulatory or decision-making body when their only role 
was to be an advisory group. One Group 2 member stated that some members knew their 
role and those that disagreed with this role used procedural bickering to gain an 
advantage over the rest of the group. 
Part of what undermined the oneness of purpose was the fact that the groups and 
individuals involved with the RAB represented many different priorities. A few of these 
priorities included concern about damage to the ocean caused by run-off, groundwater 
contamination caused by landfills, minority representation, and the impact of controlled 
burns, used as part of the unexploded ordnance disposal process, on plants, animals, and 
55 
air quality. The final reason given by a Group 3 member was that there were many new 
members on the RAB that never received necessary training to understand the role of the 
RAB. 
Frequencies of Question Ratings 
Vague Very Clear 
12 3 No Response Question: How clear are RAB goals? 0 3 5 1 
Of all of the questions, this is the only question with three possible responses. 
One Group 1 member and both Group 3 members answered Somewhat Clear (2). One 
Group 1 member, both Group 2 members, and both Group 4 members answered Very 
Clear (3). One Group 1 member did not respond to this question. 
The goals of any RAB were clearly delineated, as stated in Chapter H One 
Group 1 member stated this very fact. One Group 2 member stated that RABs were 
established to be advisory bodies to provide individual input to the BCT and provide 
information to the public. The Fort Ord RAB lost sight of these goals. Because of their 
desire to be a decision-making body that required a vote on inputs, one Group 1 member 
and one Group 2 member pointed out that this violated the DoD policy that established 
their very existence. One Group 3 member stated that he clearly understood that the 
RAB's role was to provide advice to the Army, but felt that the requirement to provide 
"meaningful" advice was unclear. 
Frequencies of Question Ratings 
Never Continuously 
1 2 3 4 5 
Question: How often has 
the RAB assessed its progress? 4 3 110 
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Two Group 1 members and both Group 4 members responded Never (1), one 
Group 1 member, one Group 2 member, and one Group 3 member responded Once or 
Twice (2), one Group 2 member responded Occasionally (3), and one Group 3 member 
responded Frequently (4). 
Representatives from Groups 1,2, and 4 noted that the RAB itself did not assess 
its progress, but that facilitation groups assessed the Fort Ord RAB's progress. The 
results of those assessments were that the Fort Ord RAB had not made any significant 
progress in the entire time it was established. One Group 1 respondent even stated that 
the RAB knew that they were ineffective and did not conduct self-assessments for fear of 
being dissolved. A couple of respondents were not sure of any assessments, but one 
Group 3 member stated that the Army ensured no self-assessments were conducted to 
keep the RAB from becoming an effective body. 
E.        CONFLICT 
Evidence from early meetings leads one to believe that there would be quite a 
struggle for the RAB to agree on any issue. During the first meeting in February 1994, a 
future RAB citizen member read a letter he drafted that stated public interests would not 
be served if anyone currently associated with Fort Ord were allowed to participate in the 
cleanup effort. Six questions were asked to identify some of the sources of conflict and 
to assess the level of conflict present in the Fort Ord RAB. 
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Frequencies of Question Ratings 
Never or Always or 
Almost Never Almost Always 
12 3 4 5 Question: To what extent do 
RAB members agree about 
the goals of the RAB? 4 2 1 1 \ 
Of the four that responded Never or Almost Never (1), two were members of 
Group 1 and two were members of Group 2. The two that responded Less Than Half the 
Time (2) were members of Group 1 and Group 2. Each of the remaining categories, 
About Half the Time (3), Greater Than Half the Time (4), and Always or Almost Always 
(5), received one response each from a member of Group 3, Group 2, and Group 3, 
respectively. 
After the transfer of land to California State University, Monterey Bay, RAB 
citizen members were displeased about not being informed of the transfer and talk of 
litigation against the Army was mentioned during the August 1994 meeting. The goal of 
the RAB was not to determine land transfer issues. The land transferred to California 
State University, Monterey Bay was already determined to be environmentally safe for 
transfer by the TRC, which established in 1991. 
Frequencies of Question Ratings 
Never or ■ Always or 
Almost Never Almost Always 
r,      • 12 3 4 5 Question: To what extent do RAB 
members agree about the priority 
of the goals of the RAB? 4 4 0 0 1 
Unlike the previous question, all but one response to this question was on the 
negative side of the spectrum. All three members of Group 1 and one member of Group 
4 responded Never or Almost Never (1). Both members of Group 2, one member of 
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Group 3, and one member of Group 4 responded Less Than Half the Time (2). One 
member of Group 3 responded Always or Almost Always (5). 
Frequencies of Question Ratings 
Never or Always or 
Almost Never Almost Always 
12 3 4 5 
Question: To what extent do RAB 
members agree about the means 
to achieve the goals of the RAB? 4 4 0 1 0 
The results of this question were identical to the previous question with the 
exception that the Group 3 member that responded Always or Almost Always (5) on the 
previous question responded Greater Than Half the Time (4) on this question. 
Interviewees were then asked to provide examples of how agreement or 
disagreement increased or impeded RAB effectiveness. The best and most visible 
example of disagreement impeding effectiveness is the lawsuit mentioned earlier in this 
Chapter. Even after the Army consented to the conditions of the lawsuit and was 
presenting its interpretation of the judge's opinion, a RAB citizen member walked out of 
the meeting because she did not agree with the Army's interpretation. Another example 
of impeding effectiveness was when RAB members could not agree on who would be the 
chairperson of the Unexploded Ordnance committee. Instead of working together to 
resolve the issue, two separate committees were formed and operated independently of 
each other. 
Other examples stem from the continuous procedural bickering among RAB 
members. First, arguments over meeting agendas sometimes took 45 minutes to finalize. 
Second, there appeared to be a lack of respect for order, as well as other members. 
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During the October 1994 meeting, the reporter commented 11 times for people to speak 
one at a time. There were also many discussions "off the record" in transcripts of 
meetings until April 1995 when funding was no longer provided to use a reporter. 
Finally, RAB voting members spent many hours arguing to pass two formal resolutions 
presented to the Army. However, these resolutions violated EPA regulations and could 
not be acted upon by the Army. 
Frequencies of Question Ratings 
Never or Always or 
Almost Never Almost Always 
^     • 12 3 4 5 Question: Formal meeting and 
participation procedures are 
followed by the RAB... 3 3 2 0 1 
Two Group 1 members and one Group 4 member responded Never or Almost 
Never (1). Both Group 2 members and one Group 4 member responded Less Than Half 
the Time (2). Both Group 3 members responded About Half the Time (3) and the last 
Group 1 member responded Always or Almost Always (5). This final Group 1 member 
further explained his answer by saying that the RAB followed formal procedures to then- 
own detriment. For example, instead of submitting both sides of an issue, they would 
argue until a consensus was obtained. This arguing and procedural dueling drove 
members away causing high attrition, which further decreased the RAB's ability to set 
priorities and conduct self-assessments. One Group 3 member accused the Army of 
allowing procedural bickering to continue in an effort to eventually disband the RAB. 
Initially, Robert's Rules of Order allowed the RAB to move past petty arguments 
and kept members from talking over one another. However, Robert's Rules of Order 
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evolved into a tool used to intimidate others or procedurally cripple the RAB, which 
distracted members away from the goals of the RAB. An example of this type of 
distraction was the Question of Privilege filed by one citizen member against other 
citizen members. The Question of Privilege was filed in August 1996 accusing members 
of conspiracy to undermine the RAB, gross negligence, and flagrant abuse of RAB by- 
laws. This issue, placed with the Procedures Committee in December 1996, continued to 
be a major point of contention in February 1999. The member accused of these 
wrongdoings wanted closure on this issue, but was told by the Procedures Committee 
chairman, who was also the person that filed the charges, that the committee had not yet 
ruled on this issue. A Group 4 member stated that some RAB members orchestrated 
walkouts to eliminate a quorum needed for an official vote on an issue. This Group 4 
member also stated that interpersonal conflicts combined with a lack of trust of the Army 
increased adversarial relationships within the RAB and decreased effectiveness. 
However, even if the RAB did get bogged down in procedural arguments, it was a forum 
to voice opinions that were sometimes acted upon, such as stopping prescribed burns 
until more information could be gathered. 
Frequencies of Question Ratings 
Very Low Very High 
12 3 4 5 
Question: TheRAB'sappreciation 
of the Army's point of view is... 5 112 0 
All three Group 1 members and Both Group 4 members responded Very Low (1), 
both Group 2 members responded Low (2) and Neutral (3), and both Group 3 members 
responded High (4). One Group 1 representative responded that early in the process 
RAB appreciation was high, but as the process continued that appreciation declined and 
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currently was Low (2). Another Group 1 representative simply stated that the RAB did 
not respect the Army or its point of view. The third Group 1 member responded that 
while she thought the overall appreciation was Low (2), there were some individual 
members of the RAB that had a high appreciation of the Army's point of view. 
There were several reasons why some RAB members had a low appreciation of 
the Army. First, RAB members felt that the Army was withholding information from 
RAB committees, which decreased their ability to provide input. This general distrust of 
the Army by some RAB members increased after the lawsuit was filed and the Army 
became more suspicious about being forthcoming with requested information. Second, 
steps taken by Army representatives on the RAB to get approval from their Chain of 
Command were interpreted as intentionally delaying the process or manipulation of the 
process. Finally, as early as October 1994, RAB members were suspicious of the Army 
and other regulatory agencies because they felt that they would be overruled on issues 
because there were only 13 citizen members and 23 Army and regulatory agency 
representatives. 
When asked what could be done to increase the RAB's appreciation of the 
Army's position, several options were provided. The simplest input was to just have 
RAB members be decent and respect each other and stop personal attacks. Bringing in a 
community leader that RAB members trusted as the Community Co-chair was 
recommended. Another suggestion was to clearly explain the written goals of the RAB 
and provide measures of performance so that the RAB could make self-assessments. 
Finally, going back to a previous section, was the suggestion that the RAB needed more 
technically savvy members. One Group 4 member was not as optimistic. She stated that 
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there was no way appreciation for the Army could be increased with the current group of 
people associated with the RAB. In support of this statement, one Group 3 member 
stated that the Army was good at making enemies and that his distrust of the Army 
increased his resolve to fight. 
Frequencies of Question Ratings 
Very Low Very High 
12 3 4 5 
Question: The Army's appreciation 
of the RAB's input is... 3 4 10 1 
Two Group 1 members and one Group 4 member responded Very Low (1). One 
Group 2 member, both Group 3 members, and one Group 4 member responded Low (2). 
One Group 2 member responded Neutral (3) and the last Group 1 member responded 
Very High (5). Two Group 1 representatives stated that the Army received no usable 
input from the RAB even after spending approximately $50,000 on training and over 
$100,000 for one of the facilitation groups. Of the other two facilitation groups involved 
with the RAB, Monterey County provided one at no charge and the U.S. EPA paid for the 
third. One Group 1 member stated that it was difficult for RAB members to display any 
form of cooperation with the Army because they were met with hostility from other 
members. Because of this, inputs were not openly presented to the Army. One Group 4 
member questioned why the Army should appreciate RAB inputs when the Army was 
sued, setup, and used by the RAB to further personal agendas. One Group 3 member 
stated that the Army did not consider the RAB important, and therefore, ignored RAB 
inputs. As early as October 1994, one RAB citizen member said that the only reason the 
Army established a RAB was because higher authorities told them to do so. 
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When asked what could be done to increase the Army's appreciation of the RAB, 
several suggestions were presented. First, if there were more technically oriented people 
on the RAB, then more technical discussions could be conducted regarding cleanup 
issues. At times, the Army was not unwilling to discuss issues with the RAB, but unable 
to because of the highly technical nature of the issue. Second, take personal agendas and 
emotions out of RAB discussions and have members come to meetings with open minds 
and prepared to have healthy discussions about environmental cleanup issues. Third, 
change the goal of the RAB away from transfer of land as quickly as possible. By having 
the aura of urgency surrounding environmental cleanup, citizen members became 
suspicious that shortcuts would be taken, which could adversely affect their well being. 
Finally, the Army should maintain some form of control over how the RAB is operated 
so that the RAB does not become mired with personal issues. 
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V. DISCUSSIONS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A.       DISCUSSIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
1.   Citizen Involvement 
Hypothesis:    As an advisory group minimizes membership turnover, more time 
is available to spend on pertinent issues. 
The Fort Ord Restoration Advisory Board (RAB) was plagued with membership 
problems from the very beginning. First, despite advertisements and a public meeting to 
publicize the formation of the Fort Ord RAB, only 19 applications were received to select 
the initial cadre of 11 citizen members. Second, high attrition was a problem with the 
Fort Ord RAB throughout its existence, which created additional ramifications. While 
early RAB members received technical and parliamentary procedure training, only two of 
those members remained when the RAB was disestablished. The only methods of 
obtaining technical information after the initial series of lectures were through self-study 
or technical presentations at monthly RAB meetings. Unfortunately, because of 
procedural and petty arguing at monthly meetings, technical presentations were often 
cancelled, denying new RAB members valuable training. Finally, realizing the need to 
increase membership, a selection committee was established in February 1995 to 
determine criteria for selection of new members. After nine months, the selection 
committee could not agree on selection criteria. At this point, the selection committee 
was disbanded and all applicants were accepted regardless of any previous involvement 
in working with groups or technical knowledge of environmental cleanup. 
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Because of continuous fluctuations in membership, the Fort Ord RAB needed to 
revisit many technical issues to continually update new members, which hindered its 
ability to move forward on many of the issues involved with environmental cleanup. 
Hypothesis:     The more knowledge an advisory group has about bureaucratic 
processes and the technical aspects of environmental cleanup, the more likely they are to 
establish credibility with bureaucrats and effectively fulfill their advisory role. 
A lack of understanding of bureaucratic processes was evident in several ways. 
First, since procedural knowledge of how to conduct a meeting was low, Robert's Rules 
of Order was given to RAB members to help them better understand this process. The 
outcomes of this were members quoting the procedures during the meeting to intimidate 
members less familiar with these procedures, which reduced participation in meetings. 
Second, the author witnessed several additional examples of procedural difficulties 
encountered by the RAB. These examples include taking in excess of 45 minutes to 
agree on an agenda, openly arguing among RAB members with the public present, and 
arguing with members of the public during public comment periods. Third, the Fort Ord 
RAB could not follow the mandate that established the "advisory" board. Instead of 
providing individual inputs as stated in the Presidential Revitalization Plan, RAB 
members continued to argue among themselves until a consensus was obtained. From 
interviews with both citizen members and agency representatives, the Fort Ord RAB's 
inability to get past procedural issues, such as requiring a consensus, kept them from 
providing recommendations regarding environmental cleanup issues. Finally, in order to 
adhere to by-laws, they must first be drafted and adopted. Despite their formation in May 
1994, RAB by-laws were not formally adopted until January 1995, after the seventh 
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revision. According to the by-laws, a member must reapply for membership after a two- 
year term. When a member failed to reapply and was not allowed to participate in the 
meeting by the facilitator who was working with the RAB, it was viewed as a power play 
by the Army to undermine the RAB. 
Regarding environmental cleanup, the RAB needed as much technical training as 
possible since few of the members had any knowledge or experience in this area prior to 
becoming a member. Yet because of the procedural infighting that occurred on a 
continual basis, many early members that received training were no longer RAB 
members and new members could not receive technical presentations because of time 
constraints placed on meetings. 
2.   Autonomy 
Hypothesis:     The more autonomous the advisory group is from its sponsoring 
agency, the more likely the advisory group is to effectively fulfill their advisory role. 
Continuing to use Houghton's (1988) model of autonomy from Chapter IQ, the 
Fort Ord RAB was assessed as to how effective it was in meeting those measures. First, 
the Fort Ord RAB was able to amend or veto Army recommendations regarding 
environmental cleanup, but not without difficulty. The Fort Ord RAB had to overcome 
the fact that the BRAC Cleanup Plan for Fort Ord was already completed prior to the 
RAB even being established. Within the forum of the RAB, members were able to force 
the Army to reevaluate its policy on controlled burns to clear areas prior to cleanup and 
by having safety brochures printed in both English and Spanish, rather than English 
alone. Indirectly, it was a RAB member outside the forum of the RAB that had the 
67 
greatest impact, which was the lawsuit mentioned in Chapter IV. Second, with regard to 
control of the agenda, there was a substantial difference of opinion between community 
members and agency representatives. Community members stated that they had füll 
control of non-substantive or procedural issues on the agenda. On the other hand, Army 
and agency representatives stated that community members had full control of the agenda 
with the exception of technical presentation. This was detrimental to the RAB because 
procedural bickering over proposed agendas led to some of the problems stated in the 
previous section. Items missing from RAB agendas were issues of budget, structure and 
staffing. The mandate that established RABs allowed no control over budget, structure of 
the RAB, or staffing. The RAB authored its own by-laws, but these were often ignored. 
Third, the Fort Ord RAB did not demonstrate its ability to gather its own information. 
From interviews and review of meeting minutes, most of the RAB members relied 
heavily on the Army, U.S. EPA, and California EPA for technical information. A lone 
exception was when an environmental group with representation on the RAB gathered 
independent information and was also given a Technical Assistance Grant by the U.S. 
EPA to hire an independent expert to review documents provided by the Army. Citizen 
members contended that they gathered their own information, but provided vague 
responses when pressed by the Army or EPA for their sources. This reduced their ability 
to formulate and substantiate viable recommendations. Finally, few RAB members 
represented community or special interest groups to draw support for their 
recommendations. Many simply acted as individuals representing their own personal 
views and not a true representation of the community, which was noted by Knapp, 
Matier, and Olshansky (1998) in Chapter HI as a hindrance to group effectiveness. 
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Because the Fort Ord RAB could not gain any substantial amount of autonomy 
from the Army, through their own actions and because of the mandates that formed all 
RABs, they were unable to provide useful recommendations, which deceased their 
effectiveness. 
3.   Expectations and Trust 
Hypothesis:    The greater the alignment of expectations and trust between citizen 
participants and the sponsoring agency, the more likely the advisory group is to 
effectively fulfill their advisory role. 
Using Rosner's (1978) views on expectations and cause and effect from Chapter 
m, the following conclusions were drawn regarding the Fort Ord RAB. First, citizen 
members of the RAB had their own agendas, which took priority over the common 
objective of cleaning Fort Ord for transfer to the community. Examples of individual 
agendas that plagued the Fort Ord RAB were that certain board members had individual 
concerns that revolved around unexploded ordnance, rainwater run-off, habitat and 
wildlife preservation, and lack of minority representation. The more individuals from 
these groups argued, the more frustrated other members became, which contributed to 
high membership attrition discussed earlier. Second, citizen members of the RAB 
continually attempted to be a decision-making body despite being clearly stated in the 
mandate that RABs would be "advisory" and provide individual input; thus representing 
a failure in expectations. Finally, contributing to this difference of expectations was the 
lack of trust between the Army and citizen members of the RAB. 
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For the most part, citizen members did not believe that the Army was keeping 
their best interests in mind, only wanted to transfer land as quickly as possible and 
created the RAB because they were ordered to do so. At the same time, the Army 
became more leery of providing information because of the lawsuit filed by one of the 
RAB members and voiced the opinion that the land would eventually be turned over to 
civilian use. More of this distrust was also evident by reasons given for the lack of RAB 
self-assessments. Army representatives claimed that RAB members did not want to 
assess themselves because it would show how ineffective they were, and RAB members 
claimed that the Army prevented them from conducting assessments, thus inhibiting their 
abiliry to become an effective body. 
Even though interviewees responded that citizen participation in the 
environmental cleanup process at Fort Ord ranged from Necessary to Essential, the role 
of the RAB in the cleanup of Fort Ord was described by the majority as an Empty Ritual 
or Symbolic   So while citizen participation in the form of a RAB was initially seen as a 
means to environmentally cleaning Fort Ord, the reality was that the RAB became an end 
in itself with at most symbolic objectives. 
4.        Conflict 
Hypothesis.     An advisory group that is able to produce meaningful conflict 
outcomes, either among the primary members or with assistance from a third party, is 
more likely to effectively fulfill their advisory role. 
Using Thomas' (1992) model to describe conflict processes augmented with 
Robbins' (1992) definitions of functional and dysfunctional conflict, interactions between 
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Army representatives and RAB citizen members were analyzed. First, all three general 
properties of conflict exist in the Fort Ord RAB. Each group had the potential to interfere 
with the other, there was opposition among goals, and creating the RAB formed 
interactions among these groups. Second, not only was there conflict regarding goals of 
the RAB, but judgement and normative conflicts, as well (Thomas, 1992). From results 
of interviews, the majority stated that the RAB could not agree on the goals. The Army 
wanted to environmentally cleanup Fort Ord to transfer land to civilian use, while RAB 
citizen members championed their individual agendas using the forum of the RAB to do 
so. The best example of judgmental conflict, or means to achieve goals stemmed from 
the use of controlled burns to initially clear areas before searching for unexploded 
ordnance, which was the preferred method of the Army. This met with opposition from 
RAB members who felt that mechanical clearing methods should be used instead. 
Normative conflicts revealed themselves in interviews from both Army and regulatory 
agency representatives and citizen members. From Army and regulatory agency 
representatives, the lack of technical knowledge of citizen members simply impeded their 
ability to complete any environmental cleanup actions. From citizen members, their 
distrust of the Army made them challenge the Army because they did not believe that the 
Army had their best interests in mind. 
The third property of conflict was evident in the parties' management of conflict. 
Specifically, the styles of managing conflict by the Army and citizen members of the 
RAB did not combine well to arrive at workable outcomes without outside assistance. 
The Army tried not to be confrontational with RAB members, but in the process lost its 
ability to take an assertive stance without being seen as a move to suppress RAB 
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members. Therefore, following the Thomas (1992) model, the Army was very 
cooperative and was between Accommodating and Compromising. RAB members, on 
the other hand, were very assertive and uncooperative or neither assertive nor 
cooperative. The RAB member that filed the lawsuit against the Army was Competing 
and used the courts to make his position clear. Another RAB member used Avoidance as 
her method of conflict behavior because she walked out of a meeting while the Army was 
presenting its explanation of the outcome of the lawsuit. 
Three separate facilitators were used throughout the history of the Fort Ord RAB. 
Because the RAB could not resolve conflicts, even with the assistance of facilitators, the 
second facilitation group recommended that the RAB disband in 1997 and the third 
concurred with the Office of the Secretary of Defense in May 1999 to disband the Fort 
Ord RAB. Finally, neither group held the other in very high regard. Predominantly 
negative responses were given to the questions about one sides appreciation of the others 
point of view or input. This polarity between the Army and citizen members of the RAB 
created a dysfunctional conflict situation as described by Robbins (1992) in Chapter m. 
Because all members of the Fort Ord RAB could not resolve their differences 
within their own group or with the assistance of outside groups, communication among 
the members of the RAB could not go beyond petty arguments and the ability of the RAB 
to work towards a common goal was severely diminished. 
5.        Primary Research Question 
What are the successful and less-successful practices of the Restoration Advisory 
Board process in transitioning Fort Ord from military to civilian use? 
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Other than providing some community members the ability to voice their own 
opinions about environmental issues, the Fort Ord RAB succumbed to many obstacles 
known to researchers of citizen advisory groups since the 1970s. Membership attrition 
lessened community representation and lowered the technical knowledge base of the 
RAB because no training was provided to new members. Since technical knowledge was 
low, members relied heavily on the Army and regulatory agencies for information. 
Because of their reliance for information, the RAB was unable to establish any form of 
autonomy since very little was given under the mandates forming RABs. RAB members' 
apparent expectations of being a decision-making body prevented them from allowing 
individual inputs, which led to procedural arguments that consumed the RAB's time and 
efforts. Despite all of these shortcomings had the RAB been able to constructively deal 
with its internal conflicts some usefulness could have come from the RAB. As it was, the 
RAB's inability to overcome conflict ended any chance of this RAB succeeding. 
B.        RECOMMENDATIONS 
First, because of inherent conflicts between citizens and bureaucrats, it is 
recommended that the services of a neutral facilitator be secured before the first meeting 
is held. The facilitator should work to eliminate any early conflicts before they have a 
chance to become dysfunctional. Second, to improve support for the environmental 
cleanup plan, future RABs should be formed earlier in the process. The more involved 
the RAB is in developing the cleanup plan, the more ownership they have in the process. 
Because a RAB is not a decision-making body, the earlier they provide inputs, the more 
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likely those inputs are to be incorporated into the cleanup plan. Thus more clearly 
defining their advisory role. Third, when an installation is placed on a closure list, a 
stakeholder analysis should be conducted to determine what groups need to be 
represented on the RAB and attempt to attract members with some level of technical 
knowledge. While it is not feasible to require every member to have technical 
knowledge, if some members have this knowledge, they can act as independent sources 
of information for those members that do not understand technical issues. Fourth, 
technical training should be provided throughout the RAB process, especially for new 
members, to keep technical knowledge high. Fifth, do not expect laypersons to 
understand Robert's Rules of Order. Some members may be intimidated by the 
requirement to follow set procedures to provide individual comments. Instead, create 
procedures along the lines of fairness and equality. Make assurances that everyone will 
have a chance to provide input and comment on issues placed before the group. Finally, 
the installation should retain more control early in the RAB process to provide direction. 
If less control is needed later in the process, give greater control to the RAB. By giving 
up control too early, any attempt to regain control will be seen as an attempt to lessen the 
RABs influence. 
C.       SUGGESTED FOLLOW-ON RESEARCH 
After the Fort Ord RAB disbanded in May 1999, the Army adopted a different 
forum to continue providing information to and seeking input from the surrounding 
communities. The same Army and regulatory agency representatives sat on a panel while 
a facilitator acted as a buffer between the panel and the audience. Many former citizen 
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members of the RAB were in the audience expressing the same opinions they did before 
the RAB was disbanded. Research on the effectiveness of this alternative approach 
should be conducted. The research would include interviews with former RAB members 
to determine if they felt community needs were addressed and examine the progress of 
the Army's environmental cleanup effort using the amount of land transferred since May 
1999 as a measure of success. 
Other case studies could be conducted at bases where RABs were formed before 
the base officially closed to determine if greater involvement by a RAB earlier in the 
process alleviated many of the problems encountered by the Fort Ord RAB.   Operating 
bases that chose to establish RABs could also be studied to see how well a RAB works 
when the facility must continue to operate while keeping community concerns in mind. 
Finally, a case study of a successful RAB could be researched to determine key 
characteristics of effectiveness from the perspective of a positive example. 
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APPENDIX A. RESTORATION ADVISORY BOARD INTERVIEW 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
1. How important is citizen participation in the environmental cleanup process at Fort 
Ord? 
Not Somewhat      Necessary       Somewhat      Essential 
Necessary      Necessary Essential 
Why is citizen participation important in this process? 
2. To what extent do you think the RAB represents all major citizen groups? 
Not at All      <Vi About V* >Vi 
What actions have increased/decreased representation? 
What group do you represent? 
3. The role of RAB members is clearly understood? 
All major groups 
Strongly Somewhat      Neither Agree   Somewhat 
Disagree Disagree nor Disagree     Agree 
How has this affected RAB performance? Example. 
4. Necessary training was provided to the RAB members? 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Somewhat      Neither Agree   Somewhat 





What type(s) of training was/were provided? 
What was the most beneficial training? 
Is there any other type of training that would have enabled the RAB to be more effective? 
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5. On average, to what extent has the RAB been involved in the development of the 
BRAC Cleanup Plan? 
Not Somewhat      Moderately     Strongly Fully 
Involved Involved Involved Involved Involved 
Has the level of involvement been too little, about right, or too much? 
How could the level of involvement be increased/decreased? 
6. To what extent did the BRAC Cleanup Team implement RAB recommendations? 
Never or        <x/2the About Vi        >1/2the Always or 
Almost Time the Time        Time Almost Always 
Never 
What types of recommendations were most likely to be implemented? 
What types of recommendations were least likely to be implemented? 
7. The "advisory" nature of the RAB (i.e., no decision authority) significantly reduces its 
impact on the cleanup effort at Fort Ord. 
Strongly Somewhat      Neither Agree   Somewhat        Strongly 
Disagree Disagree nor Disagree     Agree Agree 
What could be done to increase the RAB's impact on cleanup efforts? 
8. The RAB controls its own agenda. 
Never or <1/2the About Vi >1/2the Always or 
Almost Time the Time Time Almost Always 
Never 
Give an example of how this level of control has influenced RAB effectiveness. 
What agenda items does the RAB have the most control over? 
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9. To what extent does the RAB gather its own information, in addition to the 
information provided by the Army (surveys, attend conferences, consult technical 












What is done with the information once gathered? 











11. How clear are RAB goals? 
Vague 
(not clear at all) 
Somewhat      Very 
Clear Clear 
What is an example of a clear goal? 
What is an example of a vague goal? 




Once or      Occasionally      Frequently      Continuously 
Twice 
What are the RAB's criteria for assessing progress? 













14. To what extent do RAB members agree about the priority of the goals of the RAB? 
Never or ^the About Vi >y2the Always or 
Almost Time the Time Time Almost Always 
Never 
15. To what extent do RAB members agree about the means to achieve the goals of the 
RAB? 
Never or        <V^the About V2        >&the Always or 
Almost Time the Time        Time Almost Always 
Never 
What is an example of how agreement increased RAB effectiveness? 
What is an example of how disagreement impeded RAB effectiveness? 
16. Formal meeting and participation procedures are followed by the RAB. 
Never or <1/2the About Vi >1/2the Always or 
Almost Time the Time Time Almost Always 
Never 
How has this impacted RAB effectiveness? 
What is an example of how this positively impacted the RAB? 
What is an example of how this negatively impacted the RAB? 
17. The RAB's appreciation of the Army's point of view is... 
Very Low       Low Neutral High Very high 
What could be done to increase the RAB's appreciation of the Army? 
18. The Army's appreciation of the RAB's input is... 
Very Low       Low Neutral High Very high 
What could be done to increase the Army's appreciation of the RAB? 
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19. How would you describe the role of the RAB? 
Empty Symbolic        Necessary       Substantive     Essential 
Ritual 
What 1 or 2 actions could the RAB do to shift towards a more substantive role? 
20. Overall, what primary factors facilitated RAB success? 
21. Overall, what primary factors impeded RAB success? 
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APPENDIX B. SAFETY BROCHURE 
DANGER signs. Do not enter afeas where you see signs like the ones 
below. Off-road vehicular traffic is prohibited on the former Fort Ord. 
MlM ssPssil 
Las zonas donde poo'ria esfar preserrte material de artilferia que aün 
no ha expiotado estän marcadas con fetreros de PEUG.RO. No entre 
en zonas donde yea letreros como los que se muestran abajo. El 
träfico autornotor fuera de la via principal esta. prohibido en el antiguo 
Fort Ord. 
If you have questions regarding the ordnance and explosives cleanup 
at the former Fort Ord, please contact- 
Si tiene preguntas reiacionadas con tos armamentos y ä erradcadon da 
expiosvos en ei antiguo Fort Ord, per favor pengaseen contacto con: 
Directorate of Environmental and Natural Resources- 
Management at the Presidio of Monterey (831) 242-7924 
Ordnance and Explosives at former Pert Ord 
If you.discover any object that resembles those shown 
inside this brochure 
DO NOT TOUCH !T! 
Instead, MARK THE LOCATION, and 
CALL THE FEDERAL POLICE 
at (831 242 -7851 or 242-7852 to report what you've found. 
* **  ü «5f TM &l K^^B^^ffl vüs73i^^^^9 
@ ¥ expfasf 
Si descufore cuatquier objeio que se asemeje a tos 
que se muestran en este folleto 
;NO LO TOQUE! 
En su lugar, MARQUE LA UBJCACIÖN, y 
LLAME A LA POLICIA FEDERAL 
al {831} 242-7351 ö 242-7852 para reporter So que encontrö. 
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As an active U.S. Army post Fort Ord's 
mission was to train solders to protect 
the interests of the United States. An 
important part of the mission was 
infantry and artillery training. As a result 
of this training, unexploded ordnance 
remains on portions of the now-ciösed 
Fort Ord. 
After reviewing the records of past 
training activities, the Army identified 
areas where ordnance may stiff remain 
and began conducting investigations 
and removing ordnance from those 
areas. Cleanup of afi identified areas 
•will not be completed for many years. 
75mm fVojacfiie 40tr!ro Projocilfe     $W2 Kantf Grenade       .».»18 Smoke 
Grenade M6? Hand 37^ Projecfite Grenade 
5g5»-' 
MIRrinffttaft*     ■   Etettc Bring Davtoe        Greeds Fuse       Bound*****«»™* 
Mire 
M127'Siap Ha«        Pjfe Smote 
Grenade 
Firing Dsvics 
Cisyraors Mine Wine Fuse 
fr-.v-jD::;;' 
aff'Hoatet SOmrsMorter 3"Anß-Tank 
SKfie Grenade 
25mm Sab CaJ for 
Stmm Mortar . 
Slram Mo-tar 2.3S" Rocket 
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